
The problems of the cities are examined in seven articles in this issue. Our first article shows that "The United States is embarked on a whole new era of experimentation in urban concerns. . . . It has come late. But at least Americans are now aware of the extent of their problems. . . ."

Rebuilding American Cities: An Overview

BY ROBERT C. WEAVER

Secretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development

THERE ARE NOW more than 200 million Americans. If present growth patterns hold, the United States will reach a population of more than 300 million by the year 2000 and its urban areas will absorb most of the increase.¹

This population growth and the massive urban expansion that accompanies it have created problems of great magnitude for American cities. For people must be housed, educated, employed and transported. Their health, recreational and cultural needs must be met.

Moreover, in the next 40 years, when we will have to build as many houses, schools and other structures as in the whole of our past history since the first settlers landed on the shores of this continent, we shall have to cope with tough questions. What kinds of cities do Americans want? What kind of densities? How should people be distributed across the landscape? And how can Americans manage to serve—in the words of President Lyndon Johnson—"not only the needs of the body and the demands of commerce, but the desire for beauty and the hunger for community."

With this urban challenge, the United States can no longer afford the leisurely, al-

most unnoticeable pace of urban growth that it knew in the last century. Nor will the challenge permit a continuation of the almost non-existent urban planning that has been the hallmark of many countries in this century. To meet the challenge, Americans will have to bring into play all their resources of intelligence and planning and self-discipline.

Within the world community—for the urban crisis is world-wide—we shall have to find the largeness of vision needed to relate the nations of the world to each other. We shall have to expedite cooperation among nations, to meet the pressures of urbanization and to develop new ways to meet each nation's particular urbanization problems. A vastly increased exchange of information on urban affairs and housing would be one way to effect this.

But obviously, cooperation is not a matter of any one means of action or communication. Governments, international non-governmental bodies, the United Nations, private individuals and companies—are all involved in advancing the information exchange and cooperation.

No nation, no matter how rich, has all the answers to the problems of housing and urban expansion. The United States, for example, is behind in certain aspects of building technology. We know we are lagging in land use planning. On the other hand, the United

¹ By 1980, our urban population will have increased by 43 million—equal to 89 cities the size of Buffalo.

HOUSING STARTS FEDERALLY ASSISTED Low-Moderate Income




chart 1

PAST AND PROJECTED HOUSING ACTIVITY : THE TEN-YEAR GOAL

MILLION UNITS

1: TOTAL NEW HOUSING STARTS PLUS PUBLICLY ASSISTED REHABILITATED UNITS

2: PRIVATE UNASSISTED NEW HOUSING UNITS STARTED

3: PUBLICLY ASSISTED NEW HOUSING UNITS STARTED AND UNITS REHABILITATED




chart 2

States is developing concepts of coordinated planning in urban regions that may interest other nations. It has developed and is exporting techniques of financing building and the construction of homes. And in the building materials field, American industry is developing new products that cannot help but be useful.

NATIONAL PILOT PROGRAMS

The United States is now, for the first time, involved in experimental programs on a truly meaningful scale at the national level. President Johnson recently established an Urban Institute, which is a private, non-profit corporation with close ties to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). This institute has a broad mandate to study the city with both public and private grants, and it is started on its way with substantial federal government aid.

A national commission under one of the best known and most progressive American industrialists, Edgar Kaiser, is studying the housing and the construction industry. Another national commission, well funded by Congress and led by former Illinois Senator Paul Douglas (who was for many years an articulate champion of housing and urban programs in Congress), is studying zoning, building codes and taxing policies, all of which have serious implications for our national housing and urban policies.

In the past, HUD and its predecessors have conducted limited experiments in new building and rehabilitation techniques. For example, in New York City last year, an old tenement building was completely rehabilitated in less than 48 hours. This was done by using prefabricated utility cores and lowering them through vertical openings that had been cut from roof to floor.

In Detroit, HUD is financing a test of new building methods using systems of columns, beams and planks, precast from low-density foamed concrete. The components can be erected quickly and easily into the frame of an expandable single family or multi-family building.

In 1967, with the appropriation for the

first time of \$10 million in general research funds, HUD began to move from these limited experiments to a meaningful long-range research effort, with considerable emphasis on the application of technology to achieve significant improvements in the quality and cost of housing for lower-income families.

HUD is deeply committed to enlisting the nation's scientific and engineering community in a comprehensive attack on urban problems. Highest priority has been assigned to seek solutions to these problems, with the newly-established Office of Urban Technology and Research as the focal point for the department's activities in this area.

This office has recently launched the "In-Cities" housing experimental project, in which a prime contractor is designing an integrated nation-wide experiment to measure objectively and quantitatively the factors which affect the rapid introduction and use of innovative housing in urban areas—housing suitable to meet the needs of lower-income families. This national project is expected to produce several thousands of housing units, built under controlled experimental conditions in some 10 to 20 cities throughout the country.

THE TOTAL URBAN CONDITION

What we consider a rush of urbanization today is only a trickle in the context of the very near future. Within our working years, we can expect it to become a torrent.


It is not too difficult to understand how Americans got into this predicament. In the United States—today a highly urbanized and industrialized society—less than half a century ago there were more people living in rural areas than in urban regions. It was not until the 1930's that Americans began applying national solutions to urgent problems of housing with mortgage insurance and public housing programs. It was not until the post-World War II era that the festering city problems of slums and blight came under attack with the urban renewal program. (See Chart I.)

And it was not until the 1960's that Ameri-

THREE YEAR AUTHORIZATION FOR LOW AND MODERATE INCOME NEW HOME OWNERSHIP AND RENTAL HOUSING PROGRAMS AND NUMBER OF UNITS THAT CAN BE SUPPORTED

AUTHORIZATION (IN
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

NO. OF UNITS THAT
CAN BE SUPPORTED



TOTAL ALL ASSISTED PROGRAMS AS AUTHORIZED IN HOUSING & URBAN
DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1968.

GRAND TOTALS: AUTHORIZATION—\$600,000,000
UNITS THAT CAN BE SUPPORTED—1,220,000

chart 3

TABLE I
Model Cities Program: First Round Cities

• Total population of cities included in the Model Cities program	33,375,000
• Total population of Model neighborhoods	3,592,346
• Total number of substandard dwelling units in Model neighborhoods	367,463
• Total number of families earning less than \$3,000 in Model neighborhoods	284,548
• Total number of adults with less than 8 years of education in Model neighborhoods	790,151

cans began to recognize the total urban condition—that the great city was a reality and that all the critical variables of urbanization were interrelated and must be considered in federal responses. So a whole new family of urban programs was born: open space land, urban mass transportation, rehabilitation, grants for urban beautification and neighborhood centers. Planning aids were greatly expanded and increasing emphasis was given to the planning process. (See Chart II.)

It became clear, however, that these solutions—each important in itself—were not enough. What was needed was a coordinated effort that involved not only the building and rebuilding of physical facilities, but a simultaneous attack on the human problems—of poverty, of unemployment, of education, of health deficiencies. There were scores of federal, state and local programs designed to meet these needs in their separate ways. What was lacking was a coordinated use of all the effective programs in individual slum neighborhoods where there was a concentration of problems.

THE MODEL CITIES PROGRAM

So the Model Cities Program was developed. This is a national effort to give cities the financial and technical aid they need to plan and carry out far-reaching programs to solve the social, economic and physical problems of large slum neighborhoods. This program gives cities planning funds as well as

additional money to carry out special and innovative projects in the neighborhoods. At the same time, the cities will be eligible for grants from other federal agencies cooperating to give special assistance to the Model Cities.²

For the first time, many of the cities will be dealing simultaneously with all the problems of a slum area and concentrating their resources to solve these problems. For example, the problem of unemployment cannot be solved just by creating jobs. There must be education and job training to prepare people for those jobs; there must be transportation, so people can get to their jobs; and in the case of working mothers, day-care facilities may be needed for their children.

Seventy-five cities have already received Model Cities planning grants and will start the action phases of their program this year. Planning grants will be made to an additional 70 to 80 cities. (See Table I.)

There will be two major benefits from this program: first, the United States will have

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² The potential impact of the Model Cities Program is nationwide. Sixty-five per cent of cities with over 100 thousand population will be included, with a total population of 50 million people. The immediate model areas include 6 million people, 441 thousand low-income families (with annual incomes under \$3,000) and 600 thousand substandard dwellings.

Robert C. Weaver, the first Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development created in 1966, has had long experience in government service. Beginning as a special adviser to the Department of the Interior in 1933, he served on several World War II boards, in New York state and city posts, and as Administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency for the federal government. Mr. Weaver has been a visiting professor at Columbia University Teachers College and at New York University School of Education. The most recent of his several books is *Dilemmas of Urban America* (New York: Atheneum, 1967).

"If local control, participation, and the neighborhood corporation can gain a foothold in our cities, then there is hope for a revival of commitment, of political citizenship, and of rebirth of our cities. If this movement fails, the logical—although not presently politically feasible—alternative may be slowly to abandon our present cities, permitting them to continue to decay, for even now they are technologically obsolete."

The Politics of Urban Change

BY PETER A. LUPSHA

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HAS THE AMERICAN city as we know it a future? This is a question that underlies much of the current discussion of the "urban crisis." To say the city faces a vast array of problems—unemployment, poverty, a declining amount of habitable housing, waste disposal, crime, a decreasing tax base, and pollution of every sort—is simply to state the obvious. A more interesting approach is to examine how the city arrived at its present impasse, and to look at the likely directions of future change. The influence of population shifts and technology on the politics and policy life of the city is of special importance. By taking a political perspective it is possible to illuminate aspects of the current urban crisis that have often remained in shadow, but are vital to an understanding of the present impasse.

The United States today is an urban nation. Over 70 per cent of its population lives in urban areas. And it is expected that in the next decade this figure will be increased by approximately 60 million persons, an increase demanding some 20 cities the size of the present Los Angeles. At the same time, it must be remembered that the United States is new to urbanism. In less than 100 years the United States has become an urban society with all of the concomitant social, physical, and psychological adjustments that such a shift requires. From this perspective, it is not surprising that numerous social and psychic

dislocations have taken place; at the same time one can only marvel at the fantastic adaptability of the human to rapid social and technological change. In the customary length of one lifetime, space and time have been collapsed by technology, opening more experiential horizons to man than was ever possible in all of past human experience. While these changes have taken place, however, cities are still plagued by problems that have troubled urban dwellers since the emergence of cities in the Mesopotamian river valleys.

The paradox of the problem and potential of urban living can be better understood, in the American context, when we realize that the institutions for urban decision-making have changed little. Patterns of governing that were designed for an era of gas-lights, large family units, and deep roots in the community are still operating in a neon era characterized by fragmented family patterns, mobility and rootlessness. It is, therefore, not too surprising that the political and administrative structures of our cities are overburdened. Not only must they operate under the increased demands of population growth, but also under increased demands for services that go far beyond the traditional functions of governing and administrative design. Demands for day-care centers, senior citizen halls, teenage recreational programs, welfare, medical care, job-training, home-making, vo-

cational rehabilitation, and a vast array of housing and renewal programs are all new problems for the political system. These are demands that were once the domain of the private sector—the extended family, ethnic groups and religious organizations. Now they are elements of a public sector that was not designed to handle them.

More specifically, the process of urban politics has over the years moved from a concern with citizenship to a concern with consumer-ship.¹ Urban governments are now viewed through the lenses of the marketplace simply as providers of public goods and services. In our highly mobile society, when one does not care for the public products in one area it is usually possible to find other public markets producing slightly different packages of amenities and services. If the monthly welfare check is too low at \$8.50 per person in Mississippi, one can go north to find larger and somewhat more adequate welfare products. If schools are packaged poorly in the central city, or the suburban educational package does not fit the consumer world-view, other areas are available.

No longer do the better educated upper-middle-class and the professional strata of our population have rooted commitments to one area or one location. Thus these citizens do not feel obliged to work within a given city to improve conditions. In fact, the costs in time and energy of such a commitment may—in a rational calculus—outweigh the benefits likely to accrue. For political change takes time and a high tolerance for frustration, two commodities that can be supplied only at great personal cost by this mobile corporate and professional élite. Thus the citizens who have always been looked to for leadership to improve conditions may simply choose to move on to an area where the public goods they desire are more available. They have forsaken their local citizenship for consumership and, in so doing, have left a vacuum to be filled by the bureaucracy. The goals of the

professional administrative bureaucracy are, however, usually directed more toward system maintenance than toward system change or innovation.

MIGRATION: SHIFTING CLASS STRUCTURES

The impact of a rapidly changing social and technological environment will probably continue to move the traditional base of community leadership toward the more passive posture of consumership, but this is only one aspect of changing American politics. More visible are the shifting migration patterns of the city's population. These reflect a process of change that has been part of the city-scape for over 100 years; yet it is a process that has only recently received adequate attention. The reason for the current interest, in part, is that the problem is now one of racial change. Less than 50 years ago, the majority of the black population lived in rural areas; now more than 70 per cent live in cities.

In order to understand the changes wrought by migration on the politics of the city, it is necessary to view the city in historical perspective. The population growth and migration within our urban areas have paralleled changes in technology, especially changes in the area of transportation. Developments in navigation, ship construction and power sources increased the flow of immigrants to our cities just as the development of plank roads, street railways and the automobile sped the dispersal of the central city population across the urban landscape. Not too long ago, it was possible to note the fingers of urban dispersal along the major arteries leading to the city, and to see the bead-strings of urban development along the commuter railways. With the development of the automobile, however, an oil-slick of growth has spread outward from the central cities in all directions.

Early cities were "walking cities" where market, housing and social activities were maintained in an extremely circumscribed area. In these cities, political functions were likewise circumscribed. As early as 1642, in Boston, certain dangerous or noxious industries, the powder plants, slaughterhouses

¹ This notion is derived from the varied and often seminal writings of Norton Long. In particular, "Political Science and the City," in Leo Schnore, ed., *Social Science and the City* (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1968), pp. 243–262.

and so forth—were legally restricted to certain locations. As we now know them, zoning regulations did not come into widespread use in the United States until the second decade of the twentieth century. Revenue accumulation for a limited set of service functions, roads, police and magistrates existed in our early cities, but it was not until the fourth decade of the nineteenth century that certain limited educational, fire protection and welfare services began to be given over to the public sector. Hand in hand with the influx of immigrants, the increased population densities, the overcrowding and the expansion and annexation came the development of municipal services. The late nineteenth-century city could still afford such service expansion, for the rooted prosperous center city merchants and the real estate-owning middle-classes wanted, needed and were willing to pay for a stable and prosperous community. The city, after all, was their home and provided their livelihood.

As these changes in the public service sector were occurring, changes in two other aspects of urban life were to have important consequences for the future of the city. The first related to the changing social structure of the city; the second to its changing political life.

The early cities of the United States had remarkably similar patterns of social ecology regardless of whether they were eastern port cities, midwestern commercial towns or western "boom" cities. If one examined the locational distribution of various socio-economic class groupings one generally found the following pattern: the lower classes were located on the less desirable residential sites, often adjacent to the main artery of transportation—the waterfront or railroad tracks; the upper classes were located on the better residential sites, usually on hills or higher elevations in or near the commercial areas of the city; and the middle classes were generally scattered on the periphery of the city, usually around the outer margins.

With the increase in immigration and the expansion of the street railways into outlying areas, the middle classes were both pushed and pulled further into the suburbs. In turn,

the rising lower classes left their waterfront homes to the newcomers and occupied the vacated homes of the middle class. The push of class and ethnic difference and the pull of opportunity for a home and plot in the suburbs went virtually unnoticed until this pattern was altered as the river of migration became a flood.

Three events worked to alter radically the traditional urban social pattern. First, shifts in technology—namely the automobile—opened vast areas around the cities to convenient settlement. Second, the passage of federal legislation establishing the Federal Housing Administration enabled millions of Americans to obtain the credit necessary for home ownership. Third, the push of class and ethnic difference was made visible by the internal migration to the central cities of millions of blacks.

In order to maintain perspective, it is important to remember just how recent these historic changes are. The automobile did not come into widespread use until the late 1920's, and was not available to many Americans until the decade of the 1940's. The F.H.A. was created in 1934, and its adjunct—the Veterans Housing Administration—was born only after World War II. As for the racial shift, the bulk of it occurred in the twentieth century. In the ten-year-period 1940–1950, for example, some 1,300,000 blacks moved to urban areas.

The result of these shifts in the social patterns of the city was to remove the leaven of a middle-class majority, leaving only a thin layer of wealth and affluence and a lower-class (largely non-white) majority. While these changes were occurring, changes were also taking place in the structure and style of political organizations in the city which, with the shifts in migration and class patterns, were to alter urban political life.

SHIFTING POLITICAL STYLES

The development of urban political organizations in many respects parallels the development of national politics. The political parties in the cities began as coteries of notables, members of the social and economic

élites meeting together to seek solutions to community problems, to select candidates and develop issues. While these cohort groups formed the nucleus of political organization, the extension of suffrage by the 1830's required that this élite seek a broad base of popular support. In some cities, this simply meant passing the trappings of power over to the lower-middle-class; in others it meant the demise of patrician politics and the rise of ethnic political organizations.

The latter half of the nineteenth century saw the zenith of ethnic machine politics in the United States.² For ethnic politics provided the immigrant—often registered to vote as he stepped off the boat—with an avenue of upward mobility, just as the ethnic ghetto provided him with a base of support. City politics of this era is usually remembered for graft, vote fraud, nepotism, vice and civic corruption and, from the perspective of the reform movement that followed, this corruption seemed boundless. Yet from current perspective, it may have been the only assurance of constructive change in the city.

What is usually forgotten about this period of the nineteenth century is that it was one of rapid urban growth and industrial expansion. Then, as now, the cities were faced with an urban crisis. Hordes of immigrants clogged many neighborhoods, living in miserable housing and unsanitary conditions. They needed jobs, food, shelter and education—for often all they brought with them besides the clothes on their backs were their foreign politics and ideologies. At the same time, the economy was rocketing through cycles of boom and bust expansion, with the urban economic élites seeing fortunes and speculation in every type of venture. The element holding this hyperactive community together was the political boss. He bridged the chasm between the immigrants and the élite, providing money, jobs and welfare to the immigrants, and servicing the avaricious appetites of the élites through municipal expansion. Through the retrospective lenses of middle-

class morality the fees of the party boss might seem high, yet he fostered stability in a period of flux and change.

During the decades at the turn of the twentieth century, a reaction to the personal politics of the boss and the ethnic machine took place in many cities, and this style of politics was replaced by the efficiency and administrative politics of the reform movement. This movement, for all its good intentions, has perhaps done more damage to the political life of our cities than all the ill-gotten gain of the city bosses. The reform movement was the only social movement consciously directed at depoliticizing the political, and while it was not the only factor in fostering the notion of political consumerism, it played an important part in that trend.

One of the reformers' first goals was to take partisan politics out of city hall. For partisanship, they believed, lay at the root of patronage and bossism in city government. The tool the reformers designed for this task was the non-partisan election. A candidate should stand, they argued, not on the political record of his party or its registration on the rolls, but on his own merits. While the intention of this reform was to get the best men in office, it had a number of side effects. First, by removing the party label, this reform often took away the one cue a voter had to a candidate's policy orientation. Second, by removing in an overt way the political party's role in city politics, this reform took away the best mobilizing force for informing and involving the electorate. Third, in placing the responsibility for discovering a candidate's merits squarely on the individual citizen, this reform greatly raised the time and information costs of participation, especially for the poorer and less well-educated members of the polity.

A second tool for depoliticizing the city was the at-large election. This reform made office holders responsible to a diffuse, general electorate covering the entire city, rather than to a specific geographic area, district or ward. A side effect of this reform was to make it more difficult for the voter to know exactly who was responsible for actions taken. A

² For further discussion of this topic, see Allan Sindler, "Negroes, Ethnic Groups and American Politics," *Current History*, October, 1968, p. 207.

second side effect was to make the officeholder less willing to undertake any specific action in one area since this might alienate or anger another section of the city. In the long run, this reform also increased the hold of the better educated middle-class business and economic élite on city hall, while weakening the impact of poorer, less well educated minority enclaves.

Another major goal of the reform movement was to decentralize the decision-making structure of the city. Power, the reformers noted, had often been capriciously and inefficiently used when centralized in a boss. By separating policy-formation from policy-administration the reformers felt they could bring greater checks and balances into the system, while at the same time increasing the efficiency and professionalization of city administration. The means to this goal was the council-manager system, in which a professional manager ran the city administration, while a non-partisan, at-large council initiated policy. All too often, however, the professional manager in daily contact with the city system and with more complete information than the council both administered and initiated policy, while the council simply ratified it. This reform helped bring efficiency and professionalism to the city, but it also aided the decline of political citizenship. People as individuals no longer needed to be so vigilant or responsible, for the running of the city was now in the hands of a professional. Now, expertise rather than political utility, reality, or compromise could be used to justify decisions.

Still another goal of the reformers was to stop the capricious use of municipal revenue and bonding for public projects which had been used by the machine bosses to provide patronage and opportunities for personal aggrandizement. The reformers accomplished this goal by passing legislation requiring public approval with a two-thirds majority for all revenue bond measures. The effect of this reform was to limit municipal effectiveness, for it enshrined negative politics; a relatively small minority could continually thwart the wishes of a considerable majority.

This reform helped also further remove responsibility from the people, for it often forced urban decision-makers to seek less publicly visible means of funding at the state and federal level rather than to seek voter consent.

In some large cities, especially in the East, the reform effort was transitory. It left its impact on administration through civil service reforms, but the party organizations were often able either to coopt the reformers or sabotage them and regain control. In other cities, the ethnic organizations were strong enough to withstand many of the initial onslaughts of reform. Yet even in those cities the reform ethic and the ethnic machine's intransigence helped increase the consumer philosophy.

The reform ethic with its emphasis on professionalism, efficiency and rationality, assisted by the rising social welfare movement, undercut the machine's ability to reward the faithful. Welfare benefits, jobs and aid were less available to the party, for increasingly these benefits could be obtained from public agencies. The public could consume services without being concerned about politics and the parties, with a lessened ability to engage in direct-benefits politics, had to turn to symbolic politics for mobilizing the electorate. Urban politics would no longer be dominated by bread and butter politics; now the stress would be laid on personality politics emphasizing candidates, style issues and symbolic appeals to past identifications.

It must be noted that other factors in the urban society were simultaneously working to support reform by weakening the old-style machines. First, many of the ethnic supporters of the old machine were moving up the class ladder; and with jobs and education they were less dependent on machine rewards. Second, many of the ethnic groups with increased money and status were leaving the ethnic ghettos of the central cities and settling in the suburban fringe. Third, the machine supporters were being replaced in the central city by newcomers the machine was either unwilling or unable to accept.

In sum, it can be said that the reform

movement helped bring middle-class values and middle-class politics to the operation and administration of many of our cities. Ironically, this was happening at the same time the cities were beginning to be drained of their middle classes, and were left with a population of the aged, the poor, and the new migrants, many of whom needed the personal politics that had been so efficiently supplied by the machine.

The urban political machines in most cities were, however, both unwilling and unable, for a variety of reasons, to bring the new migrants, the blacks, into active participation in the organization. A handful of black leaders were coopted, and the black voters were dutifully marched to the polls on election day, but the machine failed to capture the interest of the black masses. There are many reasons for this, but one of the more salient is that—to continue the irony—the blacks arrived in the city at a time when the machines were losing their reward structure. The aging political organizations also denied internal mobility to the blacks because of prejudice, black visibility, and the blacks' numerical minority status. Thus, black citizens were shunted out of partisan politics, where power and political skills could be learned, to the administrative politics of the public agencies where one was rarely considered a participant or citizen, but was usually viewed as a client or a consumer. Many aspects of the current urban malaise can perhaps be traced to this sad juxtaposition of circumstances.

THE NEW POLITICS AND TECHNOLOGY

The politics of our cities has shifted from the patronage and voter reward politics of the machine period, to the candidate-appeal personality politics of the post-reform period, to the "new" politics of the present period. This "new" politics is the politics of image, the politics of the electronic media. Today it is the image and the packaging of images that are stressed by party organizations. A candidate must not only have personality and appeal; he must have the ability to project an image of dynamism, sincerity and warmth

to the viewing audience. Furthermore, the candidate must often accomplish this feat within the limited space of the 60-second television spot announcement. It is not just happenstance, therefore, that we are witnessing a rather startling increase in the number of professional actors seeking and often winning political office. This is simply an outgrowth of the "new" politics and the new technology of campaigning.

Colorful personalities have often dominated urban political campaigns but, in the main, the old politics operated in a world of print. There was time to read over statements, to analyze their content, and even to seek alternative perspectives from a variety of dailies. Print provided a neutral distance between politician and citizen. Today, most Americans derive the bulk of their news and political information from the images of the electronic media, where there is no time or opportunity to separate statement from personality, no chance for re-viewing, and little hope of in-depth analysis or alternative perspective. Thus, the image has become the end in campaigning, rather than the means to the end of a better informed and knowledgeable electorate. The medium, in Marshall McLuhan's terms, has become the message, and the passive viewer consumes political images just as he consumes political services.

This new technology has reinforced the decline of urban commitment for, as a medium, it is geared to a national constituency rather than a local one. Also, the costs involved in its use make it an expensive means of reaching a geographically-confined urban electorate. In spite of these factors, television is being increasingly used in urban campaigning, encouraging the passive consumption of politics without the necessary active interaction of citizenship.

Communications and interaction are the keys of citizenship. This was made clear

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Peter A. Lupsha specializes in urban politics. He is finishing a book on urban decision-making based on interviews with 500 city councilmen in a number of California cities.

In describing the problems of financing city programs, this article shows that it has come about in part because "... we have not developed a workable fiscal system, federal, state and local, to finance and distribute the costs of running local governmental services and controls within the metropolitan regions."

The Financial Plight of the Cities

BY LUTHER GULICK

President Emeritus, Institute of Public Administration

IN THE PAST fifteen years all segments of the American nation have gradually come to realize that our society has drifted into a new pattern of settlements here in North America characterized by dense concentrations of people and their economic activities into a few metropolitan centers. Our ancestors did not "plan it that way." In fact, our ethic was anti-urban, our vast empty continent was laid out in small, individually owned homesteads as a result of conscious national policy, our laws were against bigness, and our definition of the good life was strongly individualistic. We longed for elbow room, privacy, small neighborhoods, town government, a local militia, no foreign entanglements, a minimum of officialdom, and a strictly limited central government.*

Yet here we are in the late twentieth century with scarcely 200 years of history behind us, faced by a massive loss of population from the soil, high concentration in a few big sprawling urban complexes, increasingly integrated economic enterprises in production, distribution, finance and communication, the collapse of local governmental institutions, a great military establishment, world power, and a burgeoning central government of, for

us, unprecedented powers. We are certainly well into a new chapter of our history, which is, on the domestic front, the metropolitan age.

Fortunately, though belatedly, we have passed the first stage of indecision as to "the metropolitan problem." We now know that the problem exists; that it will not go away by itself; that the market mechanism, which brought on this new pattern of settlement, will not "clean itself up" and make the metropolitan complex a useful and satisfying human institution. We have now decided to do something about it. We have undertaken many unrelated, often conflicting, individual "reforms" in the hope of somehow finding a workable set of solutions. A few imaginative and adventurous spirits have gone so far as to define broad goals and to reach for comprehensive, interrelated institutional cures. They seek to understand the urban system, and to make that system workable.

DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

The underlying facts of the situation group themselves into a few major categories. First are the demographic elements. The national population continues to expand, mostly by the excess of births over deaths. While there are ups and downs in the natural increase from year to year, influenced by war and job uncertainties, we appear to be headed for a national growth rate of approximately 1.5 per cent per year over the immediate future. The larger

* © The Academy of Political Science, 1968. This article was originally presented at a conference on municipal taxation held by The Academy of Political Science, November 28 through November 30, 1967, and appeared in the published account of its proceedings, *Municipal Income Taxes* (New York: The Academy of Political Science, Columbia University, 1968).

TABLE I
Characteristics of Population by Area
(March 1966)

<i>Characteristics</i>	<i>All Areas</i>	<i>Metropolitan</i>			<i>Farm</i>
		<i>Central Cities</i>	<i>Outside Central Cities</i>	<i>Non-Metropolitan nonfarm</i>	
Population (millions)	191.5	58.3	64.3	57.1	11.8
(percent)	100.0	30.4	33.6	29.8	6.2
Percent of Population					
Children under 18					
Years of Age	36.4	33.6	37.6	37.6	38.7
Aged (65 years & over)	9.4	10.4	7.3	10.6	9.9
Non-white	11.8	21.6	4.4	9.4	12.4
Poor	17.1	18.2	9.6	22.4	26.5
Median Family					
Income (Dollars)	6,569	6,697	7,772	5,542	3,558

Based on Table 25, "Economic Report to the President" (Washington, D.C.), January, 1967, p. 155.

urban centers, however, capture more than their share of this growth by internal migration on this continent, so that their growth will be more nearly at the annual rate of 2.2 per cent. While the larger urban regions continue to grow, the growth estimated for the period from 1962 to 1975 is at a slightly lower rate, reflecting a progressive equilibrium in the total continental system. But in the foreseeable future, nothing can stop the increasing significance of the metropolitan areas for our nation and its culture.

The current problems and future needs of the great cities begin with this growing population and with the internal distribution and characteristics of that population. We will soon have three-quarters of our total population in great cities.

The shortest and most revealing tabulation mirroring the characteristics of our metropolitan population appeared in the January, 1967, "Economic Report to the President."

Already over half of this metropolitan population lives in the suburbs, not in the central cities, as Table I shows. In fact the central cities, as defined and constrained by their established legal boundaries, are now static or declining in size, though this may change somewhat as they modernize their multiple dwellings and community services, and as the suburbs themselves begin to fill up.

On the basis of age, the metropolitan areas

have generally the same proportion of children as the rest of the country, but the central cities have less than their share, while the suburbs have distinctly more. The metropolitan areas have less than their share of those who are 65 and above, but the central cities have slightly more and the suburbs distinctly less. Thus the small villages and farms of America have more than their share of the older folks. It is the younger people between 18 and 30 who migrate.

The racial pattern of the metropolis is also significant. The metropolitan areas had 63.2 per cent of the total population of the country in 1964. This percentage is rising, as has been said, almost entirely in the suburbs. At that time the nonwhites in the big cities were 68.1 per cent of our total nonwhite population. This had risen to 69 per cent in 1966 as indicated in the statistics released by President Lyndon Johnson in November, 1968. For Negroes alone, the concentration in the city centers is even more extreme. One-eighth of the total population in 1966, Negroes constituted one-fourth of the people in cities of a million or more and only 4 per cent of the people in the suburbs.

The poverty differentials are highly significant. In 1964, 34.3 million persons were listed as "poor" in the United States under the Social Security Administration index, which placed the "poverty line" at \$3,150 for

a family of four in 1964. This line is lower for smaller families, detached individuals and rural populations, and was slightly less than half the comparable median income of all families of the same size in the United States. Though debatable, this moving "line" is about as good an index of American poverty as can be suggested for urban residents. It is only a third of the \$10,195 "moderate" cost-of-living budget computed for 1966 for the New York-New Jersey region in the figures released by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics on October 25, 1967.

CONCENTRATION OF POOR

The concentration of nonwhite poverty in metropolitan areas is well advertised. The statistics do not bear out the popular opinion in full. The proportion of nonwhite poor in the central cities is somewhat less than the proportion of nonwhite poor in other areas. However, there is within the cities a marked concentration of nonwhite poor in limited residential areas, the ghettos, with a distinctly larger proportion of children under six in poor families, and of unemployed youth. This disproportion is also true, but to a lesser degree, of the poor white population.

The proportion of nonwhite families living in city poverty areas declined from 77 to 62 per cent between 1960 and 1966. But the percentage of those nonwhite slum families with incomes below the poverty level has remained constant at about 36 per cent. However, these general averages, though important, do less than justice to specific areas. Sample studies of hard-core poverty areas suggest that conditions there have failed to improve or have become worse.

In New York City, for example, the percentage of nonwhite slum families with incomes below the poverty line increased from 28 to 35 per cent between 1960 and 1965, in a period of real national prosperity and increasing employment.

In the Hough area of Cleveland, between 1960 and 1965, the proportion of "poverty" families increased from 31 to 39 per cent; the number headed by women increased from 23 to 32 per cent; the median family income

declined from \$4,732 to \$3,966. These changes were influenced in part by out-migration.

In the Watts area of Los Angeles, the percentage of poverty families held at 43 per cent; the number headed by women increased from 36 to 39 per cent; median income hardly changed; deteriorated housing increased from 14 to 21 per cent and rents were higher. Unemployment rates in the slums in 1966 were generally 9.3 per cent, compared with a national average of 3.5 per cent.

The problem of nonwhite poverty and discrimination is extremely serious; however, this must not blind us to the fact that there are in the United States two-and-a-half times more poor whites than there are poor nonwhites, and that there are now over a million more poor whites in our large central cities than there are nonwhites. As Gunnar Myrdal has recently reminded us, there is danger in our thinking that poverty is almost exclusively a color problem. It is time to recognize that the central poverty problem is created by our economic and social system, not exclusively by color.

Thus poverty has become a major metropolitan problem not because there is a greater proportion of poverty in big central cities, but because social problems are more acute and visible when brought together in one place, because men can do less for themselves individually in big cities, and because men act in concert politically and otherwise only when they are associated and led. Evidently, pressure increases the heat, as in thermodynamics. As we consider the plight of the cities, it is thus clear that the problems of poverty we see in the metropolis now are not local problems created by local conditions. They are national problems created by the national economic and social system, a total system which is nonetheless immensely successful. These undeniable shortcomings of the system come to light in the metropolitan cities chiefly because of national mobility and because the densely packed urban setting makes them visible and politically potent.

Another characteristic of urban population is high mobility, especially in recent years.

There has been an extraordinary shift from the South to the urban regions of the Northeast, Midwest and Far West, and within the urban regions from the old central cities to the suburbs. It was estimated by competent authorities that 850,000 persons would move during the year 1967 from the farms chiefly into five Northern and Central metropolitan areas. These happened to be predominantly low-income Negroes with low educational opportunities and few industrial skills.

A factor in these shifts is the change in the location of employment both in manufacturing and in certain other economic processes. In 1950, some 60 per cent of all employment in the country was in the metropolitan areas. This rose to 69 per cent in 1962, and is expected to go to 70 per cent by 1975.

As seen in Table I the median family income in the big cities is twice as high as it is on the farm. These differences have had a powerful push-pull effect on population movement. Those who move out are not the poorest of the poor, nor the least educated, nor the chronically unemployed, nor the worst housed. Quite the opposite; but, by the standards of the receiving areas they may appear so in their new environment. However, the differential standards of welfare administration and relief payments in the metropolitan areas undoubtedly attract some, especially where they already have relatives on relief or in subsidized housing in the cities. For the future, both of these push-pull forces will be lessened by increasing regional equalization. A very marked reduction of the income differentials took place during and immediately after the Second World War, but the differentials persist and the magnetism of the major population centers is still strong.

While the actual and anticipated income differential draws workers to the urban areas, it is to be noted that the employment distribution within the metropolis is also shifting as the better paid industrial employment tends to desert the old city center and migrate to the outlying "factory suburbs." In seven large metropolitan areas, cited by the 1967 "Economic Report to the President," 975,000 new jobs became available in the suburban

rings between 1948 and 1962, while the central cities of the same metropolitan areas gained only 60,000 new jobs, and these were in finance, insurance, real estate, and "services." The central cities lost 150,000 jobs, while the suburbs gained 250,000. The areas of high concentration of low-paid workers, the slums, are thus left with decreasing job opportunities, on account of skill deficiencies and the high cost of transportation.

While these per-capita income levels include all incomes, of course, they do not display the highly advertised excess of individual high incomes in the larger urban concentrations. Most of the incomes in excess of \$15,000 per year, for example, are found in the metropolitan areas, especially in the suburbs of the big cities.

TAX-PAYING CAPACITY

While it would be disastrous to overlook the very special poverty problems of the metropolis, it must not be forgotten that these concentrations of need in the central cities are matched by the suburban and city concentrations of wealth and taxpaying capacity. This is shown by three sets of facts. First is the preponderance of real estate values and other evidences of accumulated wealth in the large urban complexes, especially at the business and manufacturing centers and in the wealthy suburbs.

A better index is found, however, in the known spending patterns of the metropolitan areas. The 1967 "Survey of Buying Power" conducted by *Sales Management* showed that metropolitan populations have substantially more than their share of buying power. The only categories where they fall behind the non-metropolitan areas in retail spending, as in lumber, hardware, and gasoline sales, obviously reflect the pattern of city life.

It appears that the metropolitan areas now have 73 per cent of the population, 73.8 per cent of the households, 76.8 per cent of the retail buying power, and 79.6 per cent of the personal net cash income after paying taxes, including the markedly progressive federal component. The metropolitan areas have not only a higher average income, but have

more than their share of upper bracket incomes, a percentage which rises from step to step. These are facts to be remembered as we develop our tax policies.

In the meantime, the cost of living in the urban centers is substantially higher than it is on the farms and in the smaller towns and cities, except where they are in the orbit of a metropolis. This is especially true for the middle income group and for the poor, partly because there are so few opportunities in the big city to shop for markedly cheaper housing, food, and clothing.

A part of the difference in costs is made up of added "congestion costs" in the big cities where costs generally exceed the economies of scale. A considerable part of the excess is, however, due to distinctly higher standards of public and private services maintained *and inescapable* in the large urban centers. The cities move continually toward a 100 per cent cash economy, while rural areas and small towns continue with large elements of barter and what Beardsley Ruml called "self-barter," i.e., "do-it-yourself."

The civilized life and "bright lights" of the city cost more, and are worth more to most people than the harder and less exciting life of the country and the small town. While these values are debatable, in view of the discomforts, indignities, regimentation, and frustrations of the big city life, the fact remains that people go there *and voluntarily remain* in and around the metropolitan areas.

Urban crime is but one differential, though it is symptomatic of a fundamental difference in the texture of the big city. The annual F.B.I. reports based on their uniform crime statistics show that crimes reported to the police are always substantially higher in urban centers than in lesser cities and rural areas. For 1966, the crime index per 100,000 population in the S.M.S.A.'s (Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas) was 2,068.1, while it stood at 1,080.1 in the smaller cities and at 623.1 in the rural areas. This ratio was true of burglaries and housebreaking, for example, but not of murders, the index for which was about the same in all areas. Reflecting this higher crime rate in the large cities, and com-

parably enhanced traffic problems, is the per capita provision for local police. In 1966, the metropolitan areas had 2.7 police employees per thousand persons, while the lesser cities averaged around 1.6.

These and other congestion costs are immediately translated into taxes, debts, and local budgets. They are reflected especially in distinctly higher school costs, welfare allowances, policing, traffic controls, housing, health and hospital services, and sanitation. Each of these items would justify a long analysis, balancing out the economies of scale, the incremental costs, the benefit ratios and the "spillovers." Excellent work has been done along these lines though it has been impossible to terminate the discussion with a final formula of costs in relation to size, because there are no real measures for quality differentials, comparative "productivity," or other value judgments.

Another factor influencing the computed per capita costs for the metropolitan centers is that many of the persons served come from the outside and are not even counted in figuring per capitas. For some reason, we count human beings only where they sleep. But, in fact, people when awake flow in to work, to shop, or to enjoy themselves, and then depart. Still others arrive to stay but bring with them immense problems of deficient education, lack of marketable skills, and language handicaps. As a result, the educational, welfare, housing and health loads of the metropolitan areas are sharply augmented. This is not primarily the fault of those who migrate. They are, as in the past, energetic, healthy, ambitious, and eager to enter into the new opportunities of the big city. But our current system, urban and economic, has in its headlong development, failed to maintain the *ladders of assimilation* and acculturation with which Americans were blessed, largely by accident, up until the First World War. With the new structure of our economy and the new urban system, we have introduced rigidities of education, of employment, of separation of work and homes, of unions, of working and wage "standards," of criteria of health and housing, which have eroded the bottom rungs

in the ladder of assimilation. With these many rungs missing, there is no place for the recent migrant nor for disadvantaged youth to catch hold and start his way up the ladder of opportunity. As a result, millions of willing and potentially useful people, many of whom are already in or are still gravitating to the metropolitan areas, are in a frustrating poverty trap. Make no mistake about this explosive situation. It is not primarily the fault of those who are caught in this trap; it is the fault of the changed American system.

And while we are considering the impact on the metropolitan areas of national mobility, migration, congestion in the slums, unemployment, assimilation, and other social and economic facts, we must consider a fundamental social and constitutional question. What level of American government, federal, state or local, has the responsibility over internal migration? What level can by law regulate, control, or decide not to regulate or control interstate population movements? What can a big city do to lessen or rationalize the flow into its crowded housing and job market of people who are unprepared for city life?

Under our constitutional system neither the city nor the state can legally do a single thing effectively to stem the tide, though the rapidity and quality of this movement are creating in the big cities the most serious problems of law and order, of education and of welfare. Only the federal government covers this field of our national life.

While we do not want such regulation with work or identification cards and the paraphernalia of internal visas and passports, the decision not to regulate migration within the United States is a federal policy decision and places on the federal government the major moral and legal responsibility both to protect those who migrate and those who receive the migrants. The implications of this inherent and rather obvious distribution of powers under our constitution are of the utmost importance today.

In connection with the heavy and mounting urban costs it is necessary to ask ourselves whether they are justified. There are several

approaches. One is comparison of each city with similar communities and with cities in other lands. A second is consultation with various experts and specialists, each in his own field, to determine the best practice and expert opinion. A third is a refinement of this and involves detailed and sophisticated cost-benefit analyses to determine when a service, function, or control can advantageously be taken over by the government or left to private enterprise. Finally, there is just plain "common sense," which rests on public demand and the willingness of the voters to pay for more or better services and controls.

Since all of these in fact rest on personal opinions and conscience, and therefore on political decisions, I have not endeavored to offer a statistical discussion of the adequacies and inadequacies of existing urban governmental performance. Nor have I sought to confuse the issue by discussing how much can be saved by better management and reorganization. Though highly desirable, better management and abler personnel increase the costs, rather than decrease them, for governments which are obviously doing less than is required in the face of dire needs.

Therefore, I call your attention to the obvious needs today in most urban regions for added schools, hospitals, highways, parks, water and drainage facilities, the handling of waste and pollution, crime control, libraries, museums, mass transportation, integration of local transportation with the outside, especially with air transport, and for welfare programs, adult education, slum clearance, and urban reconstruction. Not all of these can or should be supplied by local government. But government must take the lead, establish the skeleton at least, so private enterprise can fill in the rest. Why does a nation which has 3 to 6 per cent unemployed, and millions partially unemployed, some of them on relief, fail to move in more rapidly to supply some of these manifest needs of modern urban civilization? I am convinced that a major reason is the lack of fiscal resources and tools under the control of our larger metropolitan local governments. I have personally worked on many big city capital and current budgets,

TABLE II
Percentage of Revenues From Selected Sources in Cities
Above 300,000 Population 1964-65

	<i>All Cities in U. S.</i>	<i>Over 1,000,000</i>	<i>500,000 to 999,999</i>	<i>300,000 to 499,999</i>
Total Revenues	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Property Taxes	41.1	37.4	40.3	38.8
General Sales	7.5	15.8	3.5	3.7
Special Sales	3.8	4.4	4.5	4.3
Other Taxes	6.6	5.6	8.0	7.8
Current Charges	12.3	8.9	9.2	13.4
Other Revenues	7.9	5.1	8.5	10.3
From State	17.3	21.0	18.3	13.3
From Federal Government	3.5	1.8	7.7	3.8

Source: Summary Table 4, *City Government Finances*, 1964-65, U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1967.

and I can tell you they are all worked out backwards today. We never start with the demonstrable needs, with the best thinking of the technical experts who run the schools, build the hospitals, create the transportation systems, develop the housing and parks and other institutions. We start with the question: How much money or borrowing capacity do we have?

From the standpoint of men like John V. Lindsay and Robert F. Wagner, to name only two dedicated and sensitive urban political leaders, I think I can say that nothing blocks effective local action on urban problems so much as the hurdles which are created today by the inadequate tax structure of the great cities.

I would go even further than this. I would urge that one reason the American people are now unable to wage a minor war in Vietnam and at the same time wage a war at home on poverty and urban blight, which are now almost the same thing, is that our government machinery is out of date and our tax system, particularly that of the great cities, is faulty.

METROPOLITAN FINANCE

The local governments of the metropolitan regions have not been unaware of this worsening situation. They live with and feel for the human suffering and unrest which are involved. They have built schools, increased

school budgets, expanded their welfare loads, tried to modernize their slum housing, improved transportation, erected hospitals, borrowed for current expenses, and all but bankrupted themselves trying to carry the load of maintaining and expanding services and controls of urban civilization. In this they have been powerfully, though belatedly, aided by the states and by the federal government.

While the Gross National Product was increasing 54 per cent from 1957 to 1965, expenditures in the 38 largest metropolitan areas increased 78 per cent. Although their per capita outlays were already well above those of the smaller cities and other local governments, the per capita costs in the metropolises went up a further 56 per cent, a shade more than the GNP.

This would have been impossible without increasing federal and state aid. During the decade 1955 to 1965, federal aid to the states and localities went up from \$3.1 billion to \$11.0 billion, an increase of 255 per cent, and reached \$13.1 billion in 1966. During the same period state grants to the localities went up significantly, reaching \$16.8 billion in 1966. This is 33 per cent of state general expenditures and 30 per cent of all local revenues.

As Table II shows, federal grants directly to the local governments are small and hardly favorable to the major cities. But most of the federal money goes to the states and is then

passed out to various local governments. These combined federal and state grants, managed by the states, are generally quite oblivious to the new, extraordinary needs of the metropolitan areas, and tend to discriminate in favor of rural and small units. While this lack of interest in the metropolitan problem and anti-metropolitan favoritism are in part due to the traditional rural overrepresentation, the new reapportionments will do little to right the situation of the old central cities as the new representation goes to the suburbs of the big cities, which are small towns and villages in their own right and are not politically part of the metropolis to which they belong functionally.

The distribution of tax burdens in the larger cities deserves special note. As Table II shows, the cities as a whole in the United States derive 41 per cent of their total revenues from property taxes. This is their primary revenue. General property taxes make up 70.4 per cent of all local taxes collected in the cities. The percentage is 59.2 in the biggest cities since they have a larger proportion of other taxes. Local governments now collect 96.6 per cent of all property taxes. The states receive only 3.4 per cent and the federal government none. The next major source of revenue for the big cities is state and federal aid, mostly state aid. Next in order come general and special sales taxes, and then charges for utility services, like water, sewers, and transportation.

In considering metropolitan revenues and taxes in the United States, it must always be remembered that the system as a whole, and each tax, is specifically provided for by the superior state government by law or constitution. In taxation, the big cities have no home rule and few limited options. They have the good old "property tax," often with restrictive limits, and very little else, except for conditional handouts and their own utility earnings.

Recent studies have shown three important characteristics of the taxes on which the larger cities now rely so heavily. *First*, these major taxes are distinctly "regressive"; that is, they bear more heavily on the poor than

on the rich and discourage home building, especially for the poor. *Second*, they are "inelastic" and "non-responsive"; that is, they lag behind when national income goes up or prices rise. And *third*, they are "location shifters"; that is, they encourage new factories, other businesses, retail stores, shopping centers, and highly paid workers to move out from under the taxes which are levied in the central cities. In other words, the sources which the states have given to the big cities are precisely the taxes which are bad for their middle income and poor inhabitants, drive employment and retail sales away, discourage low-rent housing, exile the wealthy, and embarrass the local elected officials. The impact of this arrangement on our federal system is now beginning to emerge.

The American people have gradually required their total governmental system, federal, state and local, to assume more and more responsibilities. With each major war, depression, or other crisis, we have thrown new or expanded activities on our government so it plays a bigger and bigger part in our lives; government thus gives us more and more and takes from our combined national product a larger and larger share. Since the turn of the century, we have expanded the total government share of the Gross National Product from 6.4 per cent to 22.9 per cent. Because of wars, depressions, and our recent assumption of world power, the federal share has risen dramatically from 2.4 to 15.0 per cent of the GNP. The states have also expanded greatly from less than 1 per cent to 4 per cent. The localities, however, have stood about still, moving only slightly from 3.3 per cent to 3.9 per cent. These ratios are based on the taxes collected and assume that the policy controls involved in intergovernmental payments generally have a dominant influence on expendi-

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"... of those people who live in poverty, most are either too young or too old to work, and many others are already fully employed. As a consequence, government programs with an employment and training focus are irrelevant to the majority of the nation's poor."

Welfare Problems of the Cities

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IN RECENT YEARS, the plight of the American cities—particularly the inner city—has been labelled a "crisis." The rhetoric used to describe this crisis includes frequent references to anarchy, radical change, crime in the streets, and breakdowns in law and order. However, although it is true that violence has occurred with increasing frequency in the slums of many American cities, the conditions in the inner city have existed for a long time. The rhetoric of crisis is, principally, a response to the current problems in black-white relations, and not necessarily to significant urban problems. More specifically, this rhetoric is a result of a feeling of some members of the white majority that they are threatened by a black minority. The rhetoric of crisis was not propagated around critical urban problems such as air and water pollution, transportation, taxation and education. The term "crisis" reflects a fear of black violence.

The mood of crisis has elicited a series of rather hysterical responses in the nation's cities, including massive police and military actions, repressive laws, and the initiation of quickly-conceived crash programs in the areas of employment, housing and public welfare. Most of these programs have been aimed at cooling off the so-called crisis; many have been ineffective, if not irrelevant. Some of these programs, directed towards alleviating

or even curing the problems, have actually created further frustrations.

The nation's present urban "crisis" can be more accurately described and treated as an endemic problem—a chronic disease. This is not simply a problem in semantics, for the manner in which the nation responds to the situation is based, in large measure, on how it is perceived and in what rhetoric it is expressed.

It is clear that there are serious difficulties structured into our urban society, including housing segregation and social discrimination leading to ghetto formation, and breakdowns in the educational system, the employment market and in political structures. Both as a cause and a result, the bitter facts of urban poverty underlie and pervade all these difficulties. As far as the general public is concerned, this poverty has only recently been "rediscovered."

One of the major problems confronting American urban centers, then, is poverty. For the black poor in the ghettos, of course, poverty is bred and nurtured by institutionalized racism. For both the black and the white poor, however, poverty leads to powerlessness. Poverty is not new to American cities—historically, it has been a chronic condition. In fact, even black poverty is not new to the American city. What is relatively new is violence on the part of the black poor,

and society's resulting realization of the grim facts of urban poverty.

For the past six years, the nation has been committed to a struggle against this poverty. The current strategy is to develop more jobs and to train the poor to fill them. Efforts to increase the number of jobs and to improve the employability of potential workers have resulted in a bewildering array of programs. Federally-funded programs stemming from area redevelopment projects, from the Manpower Development and Training Act, from community work and training programs for public assistance recipients under the Social Security Act, from the Office of Economic Opportunity, and from the Department of Labor's education, training and human reclamation projects have all been initiated within the past six years. However, there is a serious question as to whether these employment and self-help programs are relevant to the majority of the nation's poor.¹

Data from the Bureau of the Census for the year 1963 show that, of a total of about 35 million people in the nation who live in poverty, almost one-half (15 million) are age 18 or younger, and over one-seventh (5.2 million) are age 65 or older. Also, of the some 7 million families who comprise the poverty group, over 1.5 million are headed by a female with at least one child age 18 or younger. Moreover, more than one-fourth of these poor families are headed by a full-time worker.² Thus, of those people who live in poverty, most are either too old or too young to work, and many others are already fully employed. As a consequence, government programs with an employment and training focus are irrelevant to the majority of the nation's poor.

Indeed, a careful analysis of the so-called war on poverty clearly reveals that the large bulk of the poor remain untouched by pro-

grams with this emphasis. One of the major difficulties is that self-help, bootstrap-type programs, while perhaps desirable in themselves, have been superimposed on a welfare system designed to deal with the economic and social problems of the 1930's and totally inadequate for contemporary needs.

As a matter of fact, the net effect of this unholy matrimony has been largely negative. In its discussion of public assistance, the *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* indicated that the present welfare system contributes materially to the tensions and the social disorganization which have contributed to urban riots.³ Of the reasons which can be offered for this seeming paradox, two stand out: (1) the government programs do not basically reduce the powerlessness of their recipients, as they are most often controlled by the non-poor; (2) the programs have often raised aspiration levels without materially raising actual levels of living. It is this latter factor—the sense of relative deprivation—which may explain how many of the government programs created to remedy the nation's urban problems have actually helped to perpetuate them—by increasing the frustration and feeling of lack of hope among the urban poor.

For example, some of the employment programs have resulted in a process referred to as "creaming." In "creaming," only the most talented and skilled of the urban poor are recruited for programs, while the poor masses are left relatively untouched. Two consequences of this are significant: (1) actual and potential leadership in the ghettos is virtually eliminated; (2) the masses of the poor who are left unaffected by the programs are even further frustrated.

PUBLIC WELFARE AND POVERTY

The major thrust of the government's programs has been to deal with the symptoms of poverty, not with its causes. Programs have not been designed to alter significantly the social, political and economic systems which sustain poverty in the world's most affluent nation.

The nation's current public assistance sys-

¹ Eveline M. Burns, "Where Welfare Falls Short," *The Public Interest*, Fall, 1965.

² Mollie Orshansky, "Counting the Poor: Another Look at the Poverty Profile," *Social Security Bulletin*, January, 1965.

³ *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), p. 457.

tem was a product of the New Deal. It was initiated in 1935 by the Committee on Economic Security and was intended to be residual in nature. In other words, it was assumed that the economic and social system was basically sound. Unemployment compensation would take care of any unemployment that rose out of temporary economic readjustments. Old-age assistance and aid-to-dependent-children would gradually be replaced by social security programs—primarily old age and survivors' insurance. Finally, locally-financed programs—known as general assistance programs—would cover those few not included in these programs. The public welfare programs remain residual in the 1960's, still unable to reduce national poverty on a systematic basis. At present, less than 10 million of the nation's some 35 million poor people receive any income maintenance payments under public assistance.⁴ In spite of this fact, the system is still overloaded.⁵

Since 1935, the composition of the public assistance recipient groups has changed substantially. The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (A.F.D.C.) program is a prime example. In 1935, the typical recipient in the program was a white widow with one or two children; today, the typical recipient is a black woman with three or four children who, moreover, lives in a central city ghetto.⁶

Among all the current national welfare programs, A.F.D.C. and A.F.D.C.-U.P. (Aid to Families with Dependent Children-with Unemployed Parents) clearly have the greatest impact upon family life in the central cities, and perhaps contribute to the chronically bad conditions there. States and local

governments contribute an average of about 45 per cent of the cost of these programs. However, each state sets grant levels for its residents; consequently, monthly payments vary widely. The range is from \$9.30 monthly for each A.F.D.C. recipient in Mississippi to \$62.55 in New York.⁷ Not only are payments pitifully inadequate; they are often accompanied by degrading indignities of the means test and by unconscionable delays. It is not surprising that life on A.F.D.C. in the ghetto has been described as a treadmill to nowhere.

In his message to Congress on the welfare of children on February 8, 1967, President Lyndon Johnson pointed out that in 1966: (1) 12 million children in families living below the poverty line received no A.F.D.C. benefits (only 3.2 million children received any benefits in 1966), (2) 33 states do not even meet their own minimum standards for subsistence in their payments, (3) a number of states discourage parents from working by arbitrarily reducing welfare payments when parents earn their first dollar.⁸ This fact emphasizes the confiscatory nature of present regulations, and their negative effect upon the motivation to work of all family members, including adolescents.

It is clear that the present system excludes a great number of persons who are in need and provides only minimum assistance to those who are included. But perhaps the most serious indictment of the present system is that, for the relatively few poor who are reached, restrictions which encourage dependency and undermine self-respect are the rule. It is in this sense that current public assistance programs, particularly A.F.D.C., have contributed substantially to the sense of powerlessness felt by the urban poor.⁹

Although public assistance laws are inadequate and punitive, administrative practices often are far worse. Broad discretion in doling out benefits is given to administrators—largely because there is little consensus at the legislative level concerning the programs' conceptual goals. State statutes are often vague, and the task of interpreting the law falls upon the welfare bureaucracies, so that

⁴ Orshansky, *op. cit.*

⁵ For a discussion of this point, see Eveline M. Burns, "Social Security in Evolution: Toward What?" *Social Service Review*, June, 1965.

⁶ Burns, "Where Welfare Falls Short," *op. cit.*

⁷ *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders*, p. 457.

⁸ Lyndon B. Johnson, Message to Congress on the Welfare of Children, Washington, February 8, 1967.

⁹ See: *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders*, Chapter III, "The Welfare System," pp. 457-461, for further discussion of how the welfare system contributes to the powerlessness of the poor.

political struggles are shifted from legislative to administrative arenas.¹⁰ Indeed, it has been asserted that the present climate of public welfare administration in the nation is based upon insidious, paranoid and primitive preoccupations stemming from the poor-law heritage of "keeping the town books clean."¹¹

STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE

Critics of the current public welfare system have advanced several strategies aimed at reform or elimination of the present program. These strategies focus on active protest against the welfare bureaucracies and on legal redress of grievances by recipients through the nation's courts. In addition, several alternative approaches to income maintenance have recently been much discussed.

The strategy of active protest centers upon the organization of welfare recipient groups across the nation. The general focus of these groups has been to demand from the present system the maximum it can legally give, and to confront the system with its own inequities.¹² A more strategic goal of the welfare protest movement is the effective destruction of the present system and its replacement by a totally new approach to income maintenance, perhaps in the form of a guaranteed income. As some protesters plan it, the col-

lapse of the system would come through overloading it; that is, efforts would be made to register the millions of people currently deemed eligible but not receiving assistance. The assumption is that an already overloaded public welfare bureaucracy can tolerate little addition to its rolls—that a breakdown would occur; any change would be for the better.¹³

Such organization of welfare recipients into a protest movement serves the direct purpose of reducing the feeling—as well as the fact—of powerlessness. One recent study of A.F.D.C. mothers has shown that members of a welfare client organization were more likely to have feelings of mastery and control than non-members.¹⁴

The strategy of legal change of the present system has focused upon the constitutional rights of the welfare recipient.¹⁵ Recent decisions by state courts have overturned such punitive public assistance regulations as the man-in-the-house rule and residency requirements. The decision overturning the man-in-the-house rule has been upheld by the Supreme Court;¹⁶ the residency requirement ruling is currently on its docket. Two types of legal action are required: one designed to achieve basic changes in the structure of social welfare laws (usually through the application of constitutional principles to the present laws), and the other designed to insure that present laws are implemented equitably at the administrative level.¹⁷

Other approaches to change are being tentatively developed through experiments by such agencies as the Office of Economic Opportunity and by Model Cities. For example, the Model Cities program is considering the funding of local experiments with the family allowance scheme.¹⁸ This past summer the Office of Economic Opportunity awarded a community action program grant to the national coordinating organization of welfare rights groups "for a program to train welfare recipients on welfare rights, education and information."

Prominent among the possible alternatives to the nation's present income maintenance system which have been discussed in recent years are the negative income tax, the demo-

¹⁰ Richard A. Cloward and Richard M. Elman, "Poverty, Injustice and the Welfare State," *The Nation*, February 28 and March 7, 1966.

¹¹ Alan D. Wade, "The Guaranteed Minimum Income: Social Work's Challenge and Opportunity," *Social Work*, January, 1967, p. 98.

¹² For example, only a minority of the states actually live up to their own minimum standards of subsistence in welfare payments. Protest in several states has focused on this fact.

¹³ For an exposition of this strategy, see Richard A. Cloward and Frances Fox Piven, "A Strategy to End Poverty," *The Nation*, May 2, 1966.

¹⁴ Helene Levens, "Organizational Affiliation and Powerlessness: A Case Study of the Welfare Poor," *Social Problems*, Summer, 1968.

¹⁵ See, for example, Charles A. Reich, "Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues," *Yale Law Journal*, June, 1965.

¹⁶ See *Current History*, August, 1968, p. 127.

¹⁷ Cloward and Elman, "Poverty, Injustice and the Welfare State," *op. cit.*

¹⁸ The Office of Economic Opportunity has already funded an experimental project concerning the negative income tax. The research is under the overall direction of the Institute of Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin.

grant (a government grant of money to categories of individuals, either universal or partial), and a combination of basic reforms in both the public welfare and Social Security programs. All of these alternatives have been loosely referred to under the rubric of the "guaranteed income" when, in fact, only the universal demogrant would result in a guaranteed income for all citizens.

The negative income tax proposal, recently popularized by conservative economist Milton Friedman, has taken various forms, and has been presented for differing reasons.¹⁹ All the proposals, however, would use the nation's tax structure in some fashion. The basic idea is to define a minimum income for all citizens—perhaps adjusted regionally—and to supplement the income of those citizens which does not reach the minimum. Friedman would make the negative income tax replace all current income maintenance programs; the basic goal is to save money through the elimination of complicated administrative structures. Others would make the program an important supplement to current income maintenance programs.

The partial demogrant would allot funds to certain categories of the nation's population, such as children, regardless of their income. Some form of the children's or family allowance already exists in some 60 nations in the world, including almost all of the industrialized nations.²⁰ All children of a specified age category receive a set allowance, paid to their parents. The universal demo-

grant, on the other hand, would allot funds to all persons. Each citizen would receive a specified amount of money.²¹ Utilization of the universal demogrant would probably be the best and most direct method of reducing the powerlessness of the poor. It could be used to redistribute the greatest amount of money to the poor with the fewest conditions attached.²² The great problem with this scheme is, of course, its very high initial cost, although taxes could recover the bulk of funds granted the non-poor.

Reforms in both the present public welfare and Social Security programs would be the least revolutionary of all the alternatives discussed. One important thrust of this approach is aimed at the creation of federal legislation which would be directed at establishing national minimum standards, uniform and applicable in all 50 states, for public assistance payments.²³

The public welfare system is only one example of an over-worked and out-dated governmental system which attempts to serve the nation's cities. Although reform of public welfare is not a panacea for the urban "crisis," it is a prerequisite to the success of a wide range of programs. Programs to eliminate bad housing and racial discrimination and upgrade public education and improve city services have little chance of widespread success if the nation does not come to grips with the critical deficiencies of its public welfare system.

Indeed, the most pressing issue confronting American cities is the powerlessness of those

(Continued on page 369)

¹⁹ See, for example, Milton Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Edward E. Schwartz, "A Way to End the Means Test," *Social Work*, July, 1964.

²⁰ See, for example, James C. Vadakin, *Children, Poverty, and Family Allowances* (New York: Basic Books, 1968); Eveline M. Burns, ed., *Children's Allowances and the Economic Welfare of Children: The Report of a Conference* (New York: Citizens' Committee for Children, Inc., 1968).

²¹ See, for example, Burns, "Social Security in Evolution: Toward What?" *op. cit.*

²² The assumption is, of course, that money is a significant source of power.

²³ See, for example, "Having the Power, We Have the Duty," Report of the Advisory Council on Public Welfare (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1966); George E. Rohrlach, "Guaranteed-Minimum-Income Proposals and the Unfinished Business of Social Security," *Social Service Review*, June, 1967.

Arthur J. Naparstek is currently assigned to the mayor's office in the City of Gary, under the aegis of a Ford Foundation grant, to carry out a series of studies leading toward the reorganization of Gary's municipal government.

George T. Martin, Jr., served as a Research Associate at the Urban Development Institute at Purdue University and was assigned to work with the Model Cities program in Gary, Indiana, to develop the family allowance program.

"There is a current view that urban education is simply a euphemism for the education of ghetto children. This is a dangerous perception. . . . Above all, the view of the city as a slum ignores the vast resources for culture and learning which reside therein. The potential for developing an urban education for an urban population remains untapped."

Urban Public School Systems

BY A. HARRY PASSOW

Chairman, Committee on Urban Education, Teachers College, Columbia University

AS EVENTS of the past few years have made clear, the United States faces no more difficult nor more complex problem than that of resolving the so-called urban crisis—at the heart of which has been the breakdown in the quality and effectiveness of education in the public schools. More than one observer has concluded that central city schools are in deep and worsening trouble and that by any criteria, the majority of inner-city schools are failures.

In its report on a 15-month study of the Washington, D.C. public schools, the Columbia Teachers College team noted:

Applying the usual criteria of scholastic achievement as measured by standardized tests, by holding power of the school, by college-going and further education, by post-secondary school employment status, by performance on Armed Forces induction tests, the District schools do not measure up well. Like most school systems, the District has no measure of the extent to which schools are helping students attain other educational objectives for there are no data on self-concepts, ego-development, values, attitudes, aspirations, citizenship and other "non-academic" but important aspects of personal growth. However, the inability of large numbers of children to reverse the spiral of futility and break out of the poverty-stricken ghettos suggests that the schools are no more successful in attaining these goals than they are in the more traditional academic objectives.¹

This gloomy conclusion could probably apply to other large city school systems across the nation, with some minor and local variations. For weeks after the opening of the 1968-1969 school year, New York City—the city with the nation's largest school system—continued to be plagued with tensions and disruptions that stemmed directly from serious deficiencies in the schools. At the end of the last week of October, the teachers' union was still keeping the schools closed while the union, the city Board of Education and the local governing board struggled over the question of control. The immediate dispute centered on the forced return of some 83 teachers to the Ocean Hill-Brownsville District in Brooklyn, a district involved in a pilot effort in school decentralization.

On October 4, in the Upper Manhattan District which includes Central Harlem, the office of the district superintendent was occupied by a group of residents who "dismissed" the local school board as being "unresponsive to community educational needs" and installed themselves as a temporary board until they held their own elections. Also on that day, some 200 junior high school students and their supporters in New York threw rocks at police outside a Lower East Side school during a demonstration for greater community control, and in the Bronx, a parent group staged a sit-in aimed at forcing the appointment of a new principal of its own choice.

¹ A. Harry Passow, *Toward Creating a Model Urban School System: A Study of the Washington, D.C. Public Schools* (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1967), p. 2.

The strikes, disorders and disruptions—often bringing racist overtones to the surface—center on questions of control, power and participation in policy determination and decision-making. For some persons, decentralization is viewed as a means toward developing new relationships between the schools and the community and thus providing “reconnection for learning.”² For others, community control is viewed as the only antidote to the widespread and systematic failure of the white educational establishment which fosters “programmed retardation for the poor and minority-group children.” Is it not a fact, Professor Kenneth Clark has asked, “that these children do not learn because those who are charged with the responsibility of teaching them do not believe they can learn, do not expect that they can learn, and do not act toward them in ways which help them learn?”³

Thus, decentralization takes on different meanings and has different purposes. For some, it is only a means; for others, it is an end in itself. For some, it represents a “giving up” on the present structures as hopeless, and a belief that any other arrangement might be better. In either case, the controversy over decentralization represents a new phase in efforts to provide quality education in central city schools. It tends to downgrade desegregation and racial balance as important concerns for educators and to focus on smaller, more homogeneous community units instead.

CHANGING SCHOOL POPULATION

The Great Depression of the 1930's, World War II, and the population boom that followed brought about a drastic change in the

populations of the cities and, of course, in the schools which served them. As the suburbs mushroomed with the flight of the white middle-class from the central cities, financial and moral support for city public schools declined. In the inner-city schools, the children of the poor, the new migrants, and those whose race or ethnic backgrounds prevented them from joining the outflow remained. The result was a rather grim situation, depicted as follows:

The most dilapidated, old and inadequate buildings house staffs of teachers from the middle-class or aspiring to it. Most of the teachers resist assignment to these “difficult” schools, have little faith in their pupils’ ability to learn, and are unable to manage pupil behavior and provide discipline. Overly large classes in crowded, unappealing rooms reflect administrators’ unwillingness or inability to provide supervisory leadership and assistance to the staff and to relate to the community. They fail in their responsibility to the student body (racially or ethnically segregated or at best imbalanced), using meager instructional material of poor quality or inappropriate nature; after school hours, involvement gives way to aloofness from the community’s life.⁴

While such a description is somewhat over-generalized, the fact remains that urban schools generally—and inner-city schools specifically—have been characterized by serious academic retardation, scholastic failure, high pupil and teacher transiency, severe personnel shortages, inadequate resources and high drop-out rates.

Following the general population distribution and housing patterns, urban schools became largely segregated on the basis of income, race and ethnic origin. Most large city systems have cores of inner-city schools, located in depressed areas and surrounded by schools serving students from more affluent homes. The discrepancies in the educational attainment levels in schools of different social-class composition are sharp. Enmeshed as they are in problems of poverty, unemployment, inadequate housing, unstable family life, political powerlessness and community disorganization, schools in the inner city find pupils unresponsive to curricula which seem irrelevant and inappropriate. All of this

² *Reconnection for Learning: A Community School System for New York City*. Report of the Mayor’s Advisory Panel on Decentralization of the New York City Schools (New York: 1967).

³ Kenneth B. Clark, *Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas of Social Power* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 31.

⁴ A. Harry Passow and David L. Elliott, “The Nature and Needs of the Educationally Disadvantaged,” in *The Educationally Retarded and Disadvantaged*, Sixty-sixth Yearbook, Part I, National Society for the Study of Education (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 30.

was known for decades but little, if anything, had been done to counteract a steadily deteriorating situation. In the early 1960's, the war on poverty and the civil rights movement combined to provide the impetus for action in and by the schools.

Several significant studies and projects had already begun in the late 1950's, and terms like *inner-city child*, *socially disadvantaged*, and *culturally deprived* began to appear in the new lexicon. The fact of educational and—as a consequence—socio-economic disadvantage was generally accepted, although the reasons for its existence were sharply debated. It was at this time that studies of early cognitive development, of language learning, of concept formation and of affective development provided an impetus for what has become known as “early intervention programs.”

Beginning with the Vocational Education Act of 1963, several important federal laws were aimed directly or indirectly at aiding those who were economically impoverished or discriminated against because of their race or ethnic origin. For example, sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made subsidies available for school personnel to develop and to implement plans for desegregation and to cope with problems involved in attaining integration. In the same year, the Economic Opportunity Act provided funds for the Job Corps, work-study programs, urban and rural community action programs, and basic adult education. It also made funds available for tutoring, preschool and day care centers, remedial programs and teacher education. Head Start programs were funded from this source.

PROGRAMS FOR THE DISADVANTAGED

However, it was the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (E.S.E.A.) that provided the greatest impetus for programs in schools with disadvantaged pupils. In Title I of E.S.E.A., the federal government acknowledged “the special educational needs of children of low-income families and the impact that concentrations of low-income families have on the ability of local educa-

tional agencies to support adequate educational programs.” Congress then declared “it to be the policy of the United States to provide financial assistance . . . to local educational agencies serving areas with concentrations of children from low-income families to expand and improve their educational programs by various means [including pre-school programs]. . . .” By the end of its first year, Title I officials reported that approximately 8.3 million youngsters had been “served.” In its second year (1966–1967), 16,400 school districts spent more than \$1 billion on Title I programs involving 9.2 million children.

With the continuing concentration of poor families in the central cities, the major emphasis of Title I has been on providing compensatory and remedial programs in these areas. As the report at the end of the second year pointed out, “Inadequate funding of big city education has contributed to this decline in the effectiveness of city schools.” However, a survey of three cities showed that only half of the children needing Title I aid were receiving it and that the billion dollars “could not, by itself, solve the problem last year.”

Within a short time, the programs for the disadvantaged had begun to fall into a limited number of general patterns, including:

1. Pre-school and early childhood programs aimed at compensating for early experiential deficits, especially those of language and cognitive development;
2. Reassessment and development of curriculum content to facilitate acculturation in an urbanized, technological society;
3. Remedial programs in the basic skill areas;
4. Enrichment projects to overcome cultural impoverishment, enhance motivation, and “widen the horizons” of pupils from depressed areas;
5. Special guidance programs to extend counseling and therapy services to disadvantaged pupils and their parents. Parent education—which interprets the educational needs and potential of disadvantaged children to their parents—

is gaining significance as a guidance function;

6. Individual and small-group tutoring programs with professionals, paraprofessionals and volunteers of all kinds to enhance the individual's self-concept as well as to provide him with personal remedial assistance;
7. Lengthening of the school day and year and extension of activities into the community and neighborhood;
8. Pre-service and in-service teacher training to deepen teachers' understanding of the life styles and growth patterns of children from depressed areas, and to test and to improve teaching strategies and methods which might work with low-income children;
9. Development of materials to involve the disadvantaged child, to extend his cognitive development, and to provide needed remedial assistance;
10. Work-study and continuation programs involving work exploration, on-the-job training, and subsidized work experience. Continuing education, especially for the sixteen to twenty-one-year-olds, resulting in new kinds of school programs;
11. Additional staff assigned to schools in depressed areas and adaptation of staff utilization patterns, including as many as a dozen "special service personnel" to augment regular faculty positions in schools with disadvantaged pupils;
12. Programs designed to bring individuals into college and other post-secondary school programs through non-standard avenues;
13. Recruitment and training of classroom and school aides who perform a variety of services and activities which enable

teachers to work in other ways with pupils and the community.⁵

PROGRAMS AND PLANS MUSHROOM

A proliferation of programs, ranging from projects for pre-school children to provisions for college and post-secondary youth, revealed considerable unevenness in quality. For example, in its first summer (1965), Project Head Start involved more than half a million children in more than 13,000 centers in 2,500 communities with programs which ranged from inept baby-sitting to well-designed experiences aimed at overcoming cognitive and experiential deficits.

A 1966 national survey and critique of compensatory programs conducted by Edmund Gordon and Doxey Wilkerson found that almost all of them (95 per cent) had originated since 1960 with about half having been started during the 1963-1964 school year. The authors concluded that a majority of the programs could be described as "successful" only if the criterion for judgment was simply the enthusiasm of those who operated such activities. In the very few instances where evaluative studies had been made, the results tended "to show ambiguous outcomes affecting unknown or amorphous educational and social variables."⁶

At the same time and parallel to the development of various kinds of compensatory and remedial programs came a concern for correcting racial imbalance and overcoming *de facto* segregation, both of which were most concentrated in the central cities. Racial imbalance was defined differently by each locality or state, but meant some uneven proportion of minority to majority group children (i.e., Negro, Puerto Rican, Spanish-American). Various plans were initiated to correct imbalance: Open Enrollment—under which children are voluntarily transferred from schools with heavy concentrations of non-whites to schools where space is available; Voluntary Exchange—under which white and non-white children are transferred on a one-to-one exchange; Free-Choice Transfer—under which parents may transfer their children to any school in the district where space

⁵ A. Harry Passow, "The Gifted and the Disadvantaged: Some Curricular Insights," in *Precedents and Promise in the Curriculum Field*, edited by H. F. Robison (New York: Teachers College Press, 1966), p. 33.

⁶ Edmund W. Gordon and Doxey A. Wilkerson, *Compensatory Education for the Disadvantaged* (New York: College Entrance Examination Board, 1966), p. 157.

is available; Rezoning—under which school attendance lines are redrawn for better balance; the Princeton Plan or School Pairing—under which buildings and/or grade levels are combined for larger attendance areas; and Educational Parks—under which even greater concentration of building facilities is initiated in order to draw from larger attendance areas.

In addition to variations of these plans, some student exchanges have been worked out between urban and suburban communities. For the most part, such plans have involved the transferring of non-white children to predominantly white schools, with relatively little bussing of white pupils. The results have not been promising in terms of overcoming racial isolation, for the usual result has been an even greater imbalance in the inner-city school.

THE COLEMAN REPORT

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provided a mandate for the United States Commissioner of Education to conduct a survey concerning the availability of equal educational opportunities for all. The so-called "Coleman Report" (*Equality of Educational Opportunity*)⁷ issued in 1966 addressed itself to four significant questions: (1) the extent to which the racial and ethnic groups are segregated in the public schools; (2) the extent to which the schools offer equal educational opportunities to the various groups; (3) student attainment, as measured by performance on standardized tests, in the various schools; and (4) the relationships between student achievement and the kinds of schools students attend.

The 737-page report and the 548-page appendix of correlation tables provided educators, behavioral and social scientists, politicians and the general public with considerable grist for their mills. Beyond the controversy concerning methodology and interpre-

tation, it was clear that racial segregation in schools was widespread and had, if anything, intensified since the 1954 Supreme Court decision banning *de jure* segregation. The survey noted that more than two-thirds of all Negro first-graders attended schools with a population between 90 per cent and 100 per cent Negro and a similar proportion of Negro twelfth-graders attended schools that were 50 per cent or more black. The same degree of racial isolation applied to teachers and other staff members. As for academic achievement, the data showed that it is the minority-group pupil who suffers most from attending schools of low quality. However, the extent to which a pupil felt he had some control over his own destiny appeared to have a stronger relationship to achievement than all other school factors combined. For black students, this factor seemed related to the proportion of whites in the schools—Negroes in schools with a larger proportion of whites reported feeling a greater sense of control.

A year later, the United States Commission on Civil Rights reported on the consequences of racial isolation on disparities in academic achievement between black and white students in a survey titled *Racial Isolation in the Public Schools*. The commission rejected "years of school completed" as a valid measure of attainment, since such figures appeared to have entirely different meaning for blacks than for whites: "By the time twelfth grade is reached, the average white student performs at or slightly below the twelfth-grade level, but the average Negro student performs below the ninth-grade level."⁸ The commission found that the differences in educational attainment had been accompanied by an increasing social and economic gap between blacks and whites, despite significant improvements for Negroes since World War II. The relative situation had not changed substantially—"the closer the promise of equality seems to come, the further it slips away."

The commission downplayed the effectiveness of compensatory education programs, citing evidence that black children in desegregated schools without such programs did better than Negroes with compensatory programs

⁷ James S. Coleman and others, *Equality of Educational Opportunity* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1966).

⁸ United States Commission on Civil Rights, *Racial Isolation in the Public Schools* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967).

in racially-isolated schools. The commission believed that "compensatory educational programs have been of limited effectiveness because they have attempted to solve problems that stem, in large part, from racial and social isolation in schools which themselves are isolated by racial and social class." The commission argued that compensatory education programs were unlikely to have much impact unless accompanied by actions designed to overcome racial isolation.

The arguments continue over the strategies for attaining "quality education for all" and for providing "equality of educational opportunity." There are those who maintain that quality is impossible without equality. More recently, there are those who argue for a complete restructuring of the school—the relevance of its curriculum, the school as a social institution, the services it provides, and its roles and relationships to other agencies and groups. Certainly the research and experience of the past decade have increased understanding of the relationships between educational outcomes and a variety of social and psychological factors within the classroom, the school, the family and the community. In consequence, while many programs continue to deal with small pieces of the problem—what has been called "the band-aid approach"—others are now beginning to plan for more comprehensive approaches dealing with the basic structure and processes of education.

A Title I study of 39 cities showed that concentrated remedial help can raise the level of academic achievement.⁹ However, such programs are extremely costly in terms of teachers, space, specialists and materials—resources which are particularly limited in the central cities. And the costs per student aided are often prohibitive. Some programs

show immediate but not lasting success. Thus, Mario Fantini and Gerald Weinstein argue that the school itself should be the focus of change, not the inner-city child. They point out that "the target of programs to improve the education of the disadvantaged has been the learner himself; the educational process itself has been off limits."¹⁰ Most intervention programs have tried to ascertain what the child's deficiencies are in terms of the standard educational process and then try to rehabilitate the learner to fit into that program. Fantini and Weinstein suggest that the educational process and school programs be the focus of change efforts.

The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders observed that "None of us can escape the consequences of the continuing economic and social decay of the central city and the closely related problem of rural poverty."¹¹ The Commission concluded that urban schools—particularly those serving children of the racial ghetto—have not provided the kinds of educational experiences which could help counteract the effects of discrimination and deprivation. There are at least four critical areas which must be dealt with and to which educational planners are giving attention:

1. *Personnel development*: the recruitment, training, induction and continuing edu-

(Continued on page 369)

⁹ U. S. Office of Education, *Title I/Year II* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1968).

¹⁰ Mario Fantini and Gerald Weinstein, "Taking Advantage of the Disadvantaged," *Teachers College Record*, 69:103-114, November, 1967.

¹¹ National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), p. 140.

A. Harry Passow is Professor of Education at Teachers College, Columbia University. He directed the comprehensive study of Washington, D.C. public schools and prepared the final report, *Toward Creating a Model Urban School System* (1967). Recent publications he has edited include: *Developing Programs for the Educationally Disadvantaged* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1968) and *Education of the Disadvantaged* (with M. L. Goldberg and A. J. Tannenbaum) (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1967). During the academic year 1967-1968, Dr. Passow was Fulbright Lecturer and Visiting Professor of Education at Stockholm University.

This article describes many current problems of controlling crime and violence in our cities and suggests that "although major problems of the police today stem from social unrest, racial tensions and civil disorders, most training programs give relatively little attention to police-community relations."

The Problems of Law and Order

BY VIRGIL W. PETERSON

Executive Director, Chicago Crime Commission

FEW PROBLEMS facing American cities cause more anxiety than those arising from crime, lawlessness, and frequent breakdowns of law and order. Crime became a principal issue in the presidential campaign of 1968. The president of the American Bar Association, Earl F. Morris, stated that crime "in all its forms is the most pressing domestic problem facing our country today."¹

Statistically, since 1960 the rate for crimes of violence—murder, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault—has increased 57 per cent.²

The results of a Gallup poll released in February, 1968, revealed that crime and lawlessness are viewed by the public as the top domestic problems facing the nation for the first time since the mid-1930's.³

The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice reported that "one-third of a representative

sample of all Americans say it is unsafe to walk alone at night in their neighborhoods. Slightly more than one-third say they keep firearms in the house for protection against criminals. Twenty-eight per cent say they keep watchdogs for the same reason."⁴

Although increases in statistical crime rates may be affected by constant improvement in reporting methods and procedures by police departments, statistical data on the volume of crime understates rather than overstates the problem. In a study conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago, 10,000 families were interviewed. Of 2,100 validated crimes discovered through such interviews, less than half had been reported to the police.

In most cities the incidence of crime is disproportionately high in a relatively small number of districts, usually slum areas. In Chicago, in 1967, of all major offenses reported, 36.9 per cent were committed in just 5 of 21 police districts and 58 per cent of the city's murders occurred in only 6 districts.⁵ In New York City, during the first 10 months of 1967, 1 out of 3 victims of murder, rape, felonious assault and robbery offenses was attacked in just 6 out of 80 police precincts in the city.⁶ A study of crime in Washington, D.C., published in 1966, reported that more than half of the total number of serious crimes were committed in just 5 of the city's 14 police precincts.⁷

Although in most cities the incidence of

¹ Sidney E. Zion, *The New York Times*, January 27, 1968.

² *Crime in The United States, Uniform Crime Reports—1967* (Washington, D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation, August 27, 1968), p. 5.

³ *The New York Times*, February 28, 1968.

⁴ *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society*, A report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, February, 1967), p. v.

⁵ Virgil W. Peterson, *A Report on Chicago Crime for 1967* (Chicago: Chicago Crime Commission, August 20, 1968), pp. 10, 11.

⁶ David Burnham, *The New York Times*, January 29, 1968.

⁷ Ben A. Franklin, *The New York Times*, January 21, 1968.

major crime is highest in slum areas, fear of criminal attack is prevalent everywhere. Early this year a survey was made of crime in New York City. The published results featured statements of criminologists who branded crime statistics as "almost worthless" and suggested that "mass media have exacerbated the fear of crime in the public." Within hours following the published account of the survey, a 59-year-old telephone operator was fatally attacked as she approached her Queens apartment on her way home from work. A 21-year-old mother of an infant daughter was strangled, repeatedly stabbed and raped in her Brooklyn apartment after wheeling her baby home in late afternoon. A *New York Times* editorial stated, "Criminologists can always prove to their own satisfaction that [crime] statistics have little relevance, as several have just done again in a *Times* survey. But it is hard to blink away the horror of the human tragedies that often lie behind the figures." Said the editorial, "The savage rape-murders of two women within the past few days serve as brutal reminders that New York, despite intensified police efforts, is still far from being a safe city."⁸

Criminal attacks on passengers of public transportation systems in some of the larger cities have added to the problems of undermanned police departments. In 1964, robberies, muggings and assaults in the New York City subways increased 52.5 per cent. When such crimes increased 41.1 per cent during the first quarter of 1965, an armed patrolman was placed on every subway train between 8:00 P.M. and 4:00 A.M. During the same hours, a patrolman was assigned to each of the city's 480 subway stations.

In 1967, the Chicago Transit Authority (C.T.A.) was hit hard by crime. One passenger, sitting by a closed window of an elevated train, was shot to death as a train pulled away from a station. By August, 1967, the Grand Avenue subway station on the city's North Side had been the scene of 11 assaults

or robberies during the year. A construction worker, the fourth passenger to be attacked and robbed at this station within a three-day period in August, was murdered. Robberies and beatings became so prevalent that Chicago police officers were required to come to the aid of the undermanned C.T.A. police force. Police canine units were assigned to patrol three North Side subway stations between 8:00 P.M. and 4:00 A.M. daily. Patrolmen were assigned to ride subway trains and district patrol units were ordered to make regular checks at C.T.A. stations. In the Chicago Police Department's proposed budget for 1968, funds were requested to hire 700 additional men, 200 of whom were to be added to C.T.A. patrols.

RACE TENSIONS AND CRIME

A national survey of 423 United States cities disclosed that 41 per cent of municipalities with populations over 100,000 had racial disturbances during 1967.⁹ By the second week in August, 1967, 31 cities had reported a toll from racial violence of 86 deaths, 2,056 injured persons and 11,094 arrests. In Newark, New Jersey, in July, 1967, racial riots accounted for 26 persons killed, 1,300 injured and 1,397 arrested. The July, 1967, riot in Detroit, described as the most destructive racial violence in United States history, resulted in 43 deaths, injuries to 386 persons and 5,557 arrests. In many cities, the police forces were overwhelmed and it became necessary to call in the National Guard to restore order. Charges of police brutality were commonplace. The dilemma of the police was illustrated during the Detroit uprising. When the riot first started, Negro leaders praised the police for their restraint but as the destruction spread they condemned the police for inaction. Officials of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (N.A.A.-C.P.), the editor of Detroit's Negro newspaper, and union officials criticized the police for having failed to take strong action when the looting and vandalism first started.

The destructive riots in 1967 alarmed the nation. President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed a National Advisory Commission on

⁸ Editorial, "Behind Crime's Statistics," *The New York Times*, February 5, 1968.

⁹ *The New York Times*, June 18, 1968.

Civil Disorders which held its first meeting in the White House on July 29, 1967. In February, 1968, the Civil Disorders Conferences, conducted by the International Association of Chiefs of Police at the behest of the Attorney General, were held in Washington, D.C. These one-week conferences were attended by 135 chiefs of police and their city managers or mayors. During the following two months, regional training sessions for police captains and watch commanders were held throughout the nation. Many police departments began to emphasize police-community relations programs and efforts were made to increase the representation of minority groups in the ranks of their departments.

In making preparations for possible riots during the summer of 1968, some departments purchased armored vehicles, tear gas grenades and guns. One manufacturer reported that over 3,000 local, state and federal agencies had purchased the Mace spray gun which squirts a chemical intended to disable a person temporarily. The New York City Police Department allocated \$168,000 for three helicopters.

The temporary calm that had settled over many cities was suddenly broken with the assassination of the Negro civil rights leader, Martin Luther King, Jr., on April 4, 1968. A sniper shot and killed King as he was leaning over a railing outside his motel room in Memphis, Tennessee. Violence erupted throughout the nation. Buildings were torched and black billows of smoke hovered over many cities. Store windows were smashed and looters had a field day. Panic gripped many cities, including the nation's capital, Washington, D.C. The National Guard as well as regular army troops were dispatched to some cities to restore order, when the police were unable to handle the riots.

Criticism was leveled at the police in many cities for inaction against the law breakers. Typical was an editorial in *The New York Times* on April 6, 1968, which observed,

while obviously repression is no cure for the sickness of the slums, it is equally obvious that preservation of order and enforcement of the

law are essential. In some troubled sections of New York yesterday there was flagrant looting while policemen merely looked on. . . . There must not be any police overreaction to violence but there must not be such palpable under-reaction to it either. To condone law breaking is to encourage it.

Subsequently, claims totaling \$2,019,865 were filed against the city for damages resulting from the riots. It was charged that "orders were given to police personnel to refrain and desist from enforcing the law."

In Chicago, seven persons were killed, several hundred were injured and 3,000 were arrested during the rioting that reached its peak over the weekend of April 5-7, 1968. Over 200 buildings were destroyed or badly damaged with losses totaling \$9 million. Five thousand federal troops and 6,700 members of the Illinois National Guard were called in to help restore order. Although some Negro leaders praised the Chicago police for restraint during the riots, Mayor Richard J. Daley was critical of his police department for having failed to take more aggressive action. On April 15, 1968, Mayor Daley announced that he had ordered the police in the future to "shoot to kill" arsonists and "shoot to maim" looters. His original statement was subsequently temporized when it met with a storm of protest.

A week after the rioting, the American Insurance Association estimated that the toll from the riots and looting in 100 cities exceeded \$45 million. The Defense Department revealed that about 35,890 regular soldiers and marines in addition to National Guardsmen had been deployed to such cities as Washington, D.C., Baltimore and Chicago. An additional 22,074 regular soldiers were maintained in a stand-by position.

The prospects for increasing lawlessness and disorders in American cities are formidable. And the local police forces, primarily, will be expected to meet the challenge.

In the face of a greater demand for police services than at any time in history, many of the departments are undermanned. Nationally, the average number of police employees per 1,000 inhabitants is two. Most cities operate with a police employee-population

ratio lower than the national average.¹⁰ And most police departments of the large urban areas are below their authorized personnel strength.¹¹

NEED FOR QUALIFIED POLICE

Recruitment of well-qualified police personnel is a pressing need everywhere. The unpleasantness attached to the growing police duties of maintaining order during civil disorders, the constant criticism leveled at officers either for underreaction or overreaction, the never-ending charges of brutality whenever there is a confrontation between the police and the citizen, the insults, abuse and physical assaults on officers and the generally unattractive pay scales have seriously hampered recruitment programs.

The median entrance salary for patrolmen ranges from \$5,769 in cities of 10,000 to 25,000 inhabitants to \$6,816 for cities of 250,000 to 500,000. In cities of 500,000 to 1,000,000 population, the entrance salary for patrolmen ranges from \$5,720 in Atlanta, Georgia, to \$8,964 in San Francisco, and in cities of over 1,000,000 such salaries range from \$6,900 in Houston, Texas, to \$8,124 in Los Angeles, California. Geographically, the highest median entrance salary for patrolmen is \$6,947 in the western region of the United States and is 42 per cent higher than the median of \$4,887 in the South.¹²

There is a universal need to improve the quality of police personnel. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice recommended that ultimately a college degree should be required for personnel having law-enforcement powers.¹³ This goal is far from attainment. Of 1,481 cities reporting to the Municipal Year Book for 1968, only 1 required a college de-

gree for such personnel; 37 cities required some college courses, and 79 cities did not even require a high school diploma. Of the 37 cities requiring some college courses, 25 are located in the western region of the United States, which, significantly, also has the highest median entrance salary for patrolmen.¹⁴

In addition to more and better policemen, many city police need greater representation of minority groups. In New York City, the police department in 1966 obtained a federal grant to embark on an experimental training program for about 1,100 men, mostly Negroes and Puerto Ricans, who did not possess the basic entrance qualifications. These men were paid a weekly salary while attending classes to prepare them for the civil service police entrance examination. In May, 1968, it was announced that the program had been reduced to one-fifth its original size because of the large number of dropouts during the first year and the reduction of federal funds.

In August, 1968, the State Department of Community Affairs in New Jersey allocated \$35,000 for a program to recruit at least 90 Negroes and Puerto Ricans for the Newark department. Under the plan, the men were to be provided with 20-hour-a-week jobs in local businesses at a weekly stipend of \$50. They were also to be given 20 hours of specialized training each week to prepare them for entrance tests in the police department.

In an effort to hire more Negroes in the Detroit Police Department, it was announced in May, 1968, that a general revision of recruitment standards had been made. Felony arrests or convictions were removed as bars to joining the force providing criminal records were expunged by the courts, a process possible in Michigan. A 20-man recruiting team composed of 16 Negroes under a Negro sergeant was appointed to conduct a 6-week drive for police applicants in neighborhoods, at sporting events and at industrial plants.

There is almost total agreement that the quality of police personnel in this country should be improved and the need for higher standards is imperative. The soundness of recruitment policies that lower standards to

¹⁰ *Crime in the United States, Uniform Crime Reports—1967* (Washington, D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation, August 27, 1968), p. 45.

¹¹ Kathleen Teltsch, *The New York Times*, February 22, 1968.

¹² *The Municipal Year Book 1968* (Washington, D.C.: The International City Managers' Association, 1968), pp. 352, 353, 357.

¹³ *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society*, op. cit., pp. 107–111.

¹⁴ *The Municipal Year Book 1968*, op. cit., p. 354.

meet an immediate need may be questioned. Public interest will probably be better served by those departments that adhere to present basic entrance standards and obtain proper representation from minority groups through intensified, imaginative and aggressive recruitment programs in the schools, colleges and neighborhood organizations.

In Los Angeles, the City Personnel and Police Departments in 1967 made major modifications in police recruiting and training programs. Recruitment centers have been established in 6 of the department's 15 police buildings in an effort to diminish traveling distance for applicants and to stimulate recruitment of Negro and Latin American policemen. Assistance has been sought from local community, civic and business groups (as well as from present members of the department) to obtain more applicants. Examination procedures have been accelerated. Interviews are scheduled on a regular basis at a patrol division of the candidate's choice. A special recruitment telephone was given wide publicity and produced 500 calls a week. During the first four months of the program about ten per cent of the officers of the department referred candidates for testing. Involvement of the community in recruitment is expected to improve police-community relations.¹⁵

With the complex problems facing law enforcement today, adequate training of policemen assumes a greater importance than ever before. Yet 18 per cent of municipal police departments do not provide formalized training programs. The departments without such programs are largely those in cities of the lower population groups and located in the southern region of the United States.¹⁶

¹⁵ Robert A. Houghton, Deputy Chief, Los Angeles Police Department, "Los Angeles Overhauls Its Police Recruitment and Its Basic Training Program," *The Police Chief, Journal of International Association of Chiefs of Police*, August 1968, pp. 34-44.

¹⁶ J. Robert Havlick, "Police Recruit Training," *The Municipal Year Book, 1968* (Washington, D.C.: The International City Managers' Association, 1968) pp. 339, 340.

¹⁷ *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society*, op. cit., p. 112.

¹⁸ J. Robert Havlick, op. cit., pp. 342, 343, 344.

The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice concluded that recruit training in all departments, large as well as small, should consist of an absolute minimum of 400 hours of classroom work extending over a period of four to six months.¹⁷ Few departments in the country meet these minimum requirements. In cities with over 10,000 inhabitants, the median number of training hours is 240. It is only in cities of over 250,000 that the suggested minimum 400 hours of classroom work is provided. And only in about one-fourth of the cities of over 500,000 population do police training programs cover a four-month period. All other cities in all population categories fall well below the four-month standard.

It was also strongly recommended by the President's Commission that classroom work be integrated with street experience during the training program. In cities having a population of over 10,000, only 42 per cent of the police departments include the concept of street experience in the training program. And although major problems of the police today stem from social unrest, racial tensions and civil disorders, most training programs give relatively little attention to police-community relations. In cities of over 10,000 population, police recruits receive two hours of training in the area of police and the community to every eight hours offered in the combined areas of law and traffic.¹⁸

OVERBURDENED COURTS

The problem of crime, violence and disorders are overtaxing the available manpower and facilities of the entire administration of justice.

In the nation's capital, felony trials must wait a year before disposition. Sylvia A.

(Continued on page 366)

Virgil W. Peterson, a member of the Illinois bar, served with the F.B.I. from 1930 to 1942, when he joined the Chicago Crime Commission. His article on local and state law enforcement appeared in *Current History* in July, 1967.

In describing a hopeful program under way in Cleveland for unifying and hastening the city's renewal, this writer says that "it establishes badly-needed priorities for public expenditure and effort. It offers a visible, highly conscious reason for community concern and commitment."

"Cleveland Now": One City's Program for Change

BY TIMOTHY AMBRUSTER

Graduate Assistant, Case Western Reserve University

The major metropolitan areas in twentieth century America share an unfortunate and, in many ways, a tragic kinship of deterioration and decline.

The symptoms of the urban syndrome—disease, crime, racial alienation, pollution, an inadequate tax base, the white exodus—are too familiar. Solutions, sadly, are not. Our cities have become so large and so complex in the two decades following World War II that, in many cases, we may reasonably fear for their future. Yet, so interwoven is this array of economic, social and political ills that the question of a single correct entry point—if, in fact, one exists—for remedial solutions remains in serious debate.

Until November, 1967, Cleveland, Ohio, had no particular reason to feel unique. Its problems were like those of countless other cities and its only possible claim to national attention was its seemingly incredible reluctance to move toward combatting them. But after November, 1967, Cleveland was suddenly catapulted into the national consciousness. It had elected a Negro, a former state legislator named Carl B. Stokes, to its mayoralty; it was the first major United States city to do so. The seeds for change, it seemed, were in the air.

Cleveland remains, in many respects, a sharply divided city. Geographically, the serpentine and highly polluted Cuyahoga

River splits the city into distinct east and west sides on its way to adjacent Lake Erie. This very real boundary has also served, not entirely by accident, to cordon off the city into two racially distinct sectors. The older east side of town, though it retains dispersed pockets of white ethnic residents, is more than 85 per cent Negro, having been the recipient of the massive postwar influx that increased the percentage of Negro residents in Cleveland proper from some 16 per cent in 1950 to 34.1 per cent in ten short years. This physical division has resulted in a sealing off of the races, both physically and psychologically—an unfortunate fact that has in many ways helped precipitate the fear and distrust pervading much of the city.

Politically, Cleveland resembles nothing so much as pre-Norman England. In the past, its mayors have gained office through loosely-knit coalitions with various of the city's ethnic leaders, and have been faced, as a result, with trying to govern through a highly fragmented, highly personalized political structure. The nature of this arrangement, which systematically excluded the Negro from any significant political voice, largely precluded any attempts at a concerted attack on the city's growing problems.

Beyond this, historically Cleveland has been run by an informal coalition of its white ethnic political leaders, the business and financial

establishment, and the city's communications media. So zealously did each protect its power base that, even had one of the city's chief executives desired to lead, he had no permanent, sizable constituency on which to base his efforts.

For more than a quarter of a century, Cleveland's political and industrial barons maintained the upper hand, and the city was governed by a series of undistinguished, if basically honest, Democratic mayors. Beginning in 1941 with Frank J. Lausche, Cleveland was served by what might be best characterized as "caretaker" chief executives. Their role was to maintain business as usual, since to do otherwise would mean encroaching upon the bailiwicks of those to whom they owed their political livelihoods.

THE NEED FOR CHANGE

Cleveland languished. By the early 1960's, following the lead of the white middle class, industry was moving to the suburbs. Failure to deal imaginatively with the issue of public transportation resulted in increased automobile traffic and its attendant problem, smog. Failure to maintain high personnel standards among city employees meant a decline in the quality of public services. Crime rates soared, as did unemployment among minority groups. The educational system became overburdened and, by 1966, fully one-third of the city's housing units were substandard.

On the largely Negro east side, economic deprivation and the deterioration of housing—coupled with the outmigration of industry and small business establishments—made the situation particularly desperate. Finally, in late summer, 1966, the lid blew off and Cleveland's overwhelmingly black Hough district exploded. After nearly a week of violence, four people lay dead, scores were injured and millions of dollars worth of property was destroyed.

Despite several investigations and a series of special committees geared to finding the causes and prescribing preventative measures to preclude future disturbances in Cleveland, by early 1967 few, if any, substantive changes had been made.

1967 saw additional evidence that the city was in deep trouble. The urban renewal program was failing. In January, the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development cut off the city's urban renewal funds—an unprecedented action. The exodus of white residents combined with the flight of industry to put the city in deep financial trouble, so much so that in February the Moody Bond Survey reduced the city's credit rating. Then, in May, the federal government cut off funds once again, this time because the Cleveland construction industry had failed to comply with Washington's equal employment opportunities regulations.

By this time, the public was becoming alarmed, and 1967 was a mayoralty election year. In the Democratic primary, the voters rejected the incumbent, Mayor Ralph S. Locher, in favor of Carl Stokes, a second-term state legislator who had narrowly missed election as an independent mayoralty candidate two years earlier. Stokes' Republican opponent was Seth C. Taft, a prominent civic figure, an attorney and grandson of President William Howard Taft. Either way, the city was going to change.

As it turned out, Stokes defeated Taft by 1644 votes in one of the closest elections in Cleveland's history. Although marred somewhat by the latent issue of race, the campaign was essentially dignified, a fact which probably contributed to the ease of the Stokes takeover.

THE FIRST MONTHS

Once in office, Mayor Stokes had to decide exactly where and in what ways the task of rebuilding should begin. After all, he had good reason to be cautious. To begin with, though he could not have been elected without white support—and, indeed, he received 20 per cent of the total white vote as compared with 3 per cent in his 1965 campaign—his victory was basically a function of overwhelming Negro support. He had, in fact, received fully 96.2 per cent of that Negro vote and was thus faced with the realization that his mandate from the *combined* electorate was shaky at best.

Second, he had to reckon with a city council which had historically resisted strong mayoral leadership. And many of these councilmen came from wards which had voted overwhelmingly for his opponent, Taft.

Third, the new mayor knew his administration must move cautiously to eliminate the probability of failure, the price of which would be high in the racially-divided city.

Stokes knew, then, that while radical, permanent change was indeed necessary if Cleveland were to be saved from itself, it was equally incumbent upon his administration to proceed with the utmost care. Concurrently, he had to try to construct a city-wide consensus in support of his programs.

In addition, in those initial months, very little went well. Two of his aides proved political liabilities and had to be replaced. Despite his campaign pledge not to raise the city income tax, he soon found it necessary to do so. Disagreements with police and with the public service departments also hindered progress. By the beginning of April, 1968, the shining expectations that had greeted the new mayor had become badly tarnished. He had won a few victories, but in the main the administration was bogged down.

Then Martin Luther King was murdered in Memphis.

A CALL TO ACTION

The death of King, though tragic, was responsible more than any single factor for galvanizing public support behind Stokes. Confronted with the ugly prospect of possible violence in Cleveland, the public rallied to the mayor in the hope that he could prevent the disorder that was sweeping other American cities. For the next two nights, Stokes walked the streets, urging citizens to go home, to "cool it" in memory of Martin Luther King.

The strategy worked, and violence was averted. But Stokes saw in the response of Cleveland's civic leaders the opportunity to bring about the change that the city so badly needed. At a series of meetings, the mayor explained to the community leaders that the prevention of violence was only a small part of the overall picture, that he was primarily

concerned with eliminating those conditions which bred potential unrest. He then asked if community leaders would join him in making an immediate and total commitment to a program that would strike at those conditions in detail, and on an unprecedented scope.

Immediately, a program was hammered out. The administration realized it would have to work fast, to capitalize on the feeling of concern attending King's death. A number of programs which were at that point in the planning stage, and which dealt with a broad range of the city's problems, were drawn together. The highest priority items were identified and, in less than a week, a broad-gauge, comprehensive plan to rehabilitate the city emerged. It was a conjoining of the efforts of Cleveland's top civic experts from the private sector and the administration's long-range programs.

"CLEVELAND NOW"

The mayor's program, called "Cleveland Now," served to identify existing problems, establish priorities, coordinate ongoing programs and spell out goals in what was to be a 10-to-12-year, \$1.5-billion undertaking. Phase One, to begin immediately, was an 18-month drive designed, simply, to get Cleveland off dead center.

Generally, the goals of Phase One were to obtain a total community commitment in a short-term fund raising drive to raise \$11,250,000 in seed money and to initiate those projects given highest priority by the mayor and his advisory staff.

Specifically, six basic objectives were set: *Employment Opportunity*: Initiation of a city-wide program to provide 11,000 full and part-time jobs and job training for the unemployed of all ages. Jobs were to be made available through a partnership among public agencies, the National Alliance of Businessmen and community organizations. Stipends for job training, reimbursement for supervision costs, and educational and counseling services would be provided by the federal and state governments. Necessary backup coordination was to be provided by the city of Cleveland. Start-up expenses would be cov-

ered by the "Cleveland Now" program. In addition, funds would be provided to expand small business enterprise throughout the city, to strengthen the city's economic base and to provide additional employment opportunities for city residents.

Youth Resources: Development of a multi-pronged program drawn up by the Mayor's Council on Youth Opportunities to stimulate and reclaim the resources of youth; to direct the energies of younger citizens into constructive channels. The program would include neighborhood cleanup projects, work training, cultural enrichment, education and recreation. The federal government in this case would be asked for funding for Cleveland's open space program and for support for the construction of new recreational facilities. The city would provide land-use planning and management and "Cleveland Now" would serve to capitalize the improvements in both existing facilities and in whatever new ones were erected.

Health and Welfare: A program designed to meet the city's crises in the availability and quality of community service facilities. Plans called for a decentralized network of multi-service centers, plus between 10 and 20 neighborhood-based child care centers for working parents with pre-school and school-age children. Federal, state and county funds would be provided for operation, with the city directing and administering the centers. "Cleveland Now" would provide capital funds for sites, remodeling of existing facilities and equipping the centers.

Neighborhood Rehabilitation: A plan to accelerate the construction or rehabilitation of 4,600 dwelling units within the city limits. A Community Housing Corporation would be formed to carry out this project, which was to include both public and private housing, available to low and middle income families and individuals for rental and eventual ownership. This program was to be run in tandem by private developers, non-profit housing organizations and the Cleveland Metropolitan Housing Authority.

Code enforcement programs would also be strengthened, along with a Community Im-

provement Plan to establish and coordinate enforcement procedures. Funds for mortgage guarantees, rent supplements and rehabilitation would be either loaned or granted outright by the federal government in concentrated code enforcement areas. The city and "Cleveland Now" would in turn assist in planning and supervising of rehabilitation of vacant and vandalized buildings in the inner city and would insure that the 4,600 units would be completed on schedule.

Economic Revitalization: Implementation of a comprehensive program to revitalize downtown economic development. Efforts would be concentrated on the acceleration of the six existing urban renewal projects, to provide capital improvements and general downtown business development. The federal government would furnish loans and grants for economic development, while the City of Cleveland would be called upon to provide capital improvements and upgraded public services. "Cleveland Now" would provide funds for technical studies, would cover start-up costs of all resulting programs and set up community education programs to provide the impetus and public support for downtown development.

Planning For The Future: A program to establish a central facility program and plan the city's future in such a way that the benefits from the city's efforts to alleviate its social and economic problems would not be lost through failure to understand the long-term effects of the "Cleveland Now" program. A policy planning and program evaluation center, staffed by the city's best technical experts and equipped with up-to-date technological hardware, would be established. It would develop data systems, review and evaluate proposals on the basis of long-range merit and suggest future priorities in program determination. In this element of the overall program, federal funds would provide the capitalization and planning support. The city would provide direction and facilities, and "Cleveland Now" would provide the funds necessary to cover start-up costs.

This, then, was "Cleveland Now," an ambitious, far-reaching gamble, requiring im-

mediate implementation. Stokes was wagering the future of his administration on the success of the program. Were it to fail, so too would fail all immediate possibility of getting Cleveland to leave behind its more than two decades of civic inertia.

Stokes next turned to William A. Silverman, Jr., his communications consultant, who, interestingly enough, had directed the 1967 campaign of Stokes' Republican opponent, Seth C. Taft. The administration knew that a major public relations effort on all fronts was now essential if the "Cleveland Now" program were to have any chance of success. Silverman's role was to coordinate and direct a massive publicity effort in the space of about 10 days in order to crystallize public opinion in the immediate wake of King's murder.

Initially, a series of meetings between the mayor and the most influential elements of the community were arranged. It was then agreed that the \$11.25-million fund drive would consist of two segments. \$10,000,000 would be solicited from the business community and the remaining \$1.25 million would be acquired by public donation. The entire fund drive was put in the hands of prominent Cleveland industrial leaders.

What followed was total saturation of the metropolitan area with "Cleveland Now," employing all available communications media. The press, television and radio were used to the fullest possible extent and more than 300,000 pieces of collateral material—posters, buttons, flyers, bumper stickers—were designed and printed over the first weekend of the drive. For the entire month of May, 1968, Cleveland was blanketed with "Cleveland Now" publicity.

PUBLIC RESPONSE

The publicity effort produced an immediate public response. The city rallied to the program to such a degree that within a week after the mayor's announcement of the campaign, it was, quite literally, the biggest news in Cleveland in 30 years. Individual contributions began pouring in to City Hall, including one gift of \$1 million. This gift went a long way toward putting the public fund drive over

its \$1.25-million goal—at this writing more than \$1.5 million has been received, with no end in sight.

While emphasis was placed also upon soliciting as much as possible of the corporate quota—\$10 million—during the four-week drive, realization of the full amount was informally set for July, 1970. In any case, Cleveland's corporate sector has responded with donations of \$4 million to date, thus assuring the city of adequate backing for the next year in projects initiated under the "Cleveland Now" umbrella.

Federal response to the drive, as hoped, has been encouraging. In August, Vice President Hubert Humphrey brought Cleveland a \$1.6-million grant, to be used for the promotion and development of Negro neighborhoods. One such venture, a combination shopping center and housing project funded initially by \$60,000 from "Cleveland Now," had already been begun by the administration at the time of the Humphrey visit, a fact which apparently helped convince Washington to make the grant. Public response has been so encouraging, in fact, that federal officials are pointing to the Cleveland effort as a demonstration of community-wide concern to be emulated by other United States urban centers. The same officials who were withdrawing funds from the city a year ago now claim that Cleveland has been given a top priority listing for the receipt of federal aid.

PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS

If initial reaction to the "Cleveland Now" program were any indicator, it seemed certain that Stokes' strategy would pay off. This unfortunately, has not been the case, though we must conclude that, on its merits, the program in the long run will probably succeed.

Within several weeks of the inauguration of "Cleveland Now"—however great the needs and worthy the objectives—the inevitable pockets of discontent and skepticism began to

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Timothy Ambruster received his Master's degree in Urban Management and is currently working toward his Ph.D. in Political Science.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE CITY IN CRISIS. EDITED BY IRWIN ISENBERG. (New York: H. H. Wilson, 1968. 234 pages and bibliography, \$3.50.)

This is an excellent compilation of recent articles that appeared in newspapers and magazines. Subjects range from riots to pollution, from transportation to housing. Each of the articles is lively, informative and well-written. The bibliography is very useful.

O.E.S.

SOCIAL WELFARE AND URBAN PROBLEMS. EDITED BY THOMAS D. SHERRARD. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. 208 pages, \$6.00.)

Any serious discussion of American cities today necessarily focuses on slums. This book is no exception. Ten experts in urban affairs explore welfare problems, the ghetto, ethnicity and neighborhood organization. An introduction by the editor points to needed reforms.

O.E.S.

URBAN RIOTS: VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE. EDITED BY ROBERT H. CONNERY. (New York: The Academy of Political Science, 1968. 182 pages and bibliography.)

Seventeen authors presented the 15 articles that appear in this book at a conference on revolutionary violence sponsored by the Academy of Political Science at Columbia University in the spring of 1968. Four articles deal with historical examples of violence in the American social scene; five papers discuss the causes of black discontent; six articles consider the political and social aspects of recent urban riots. Since all the authors are distinguished scholars, their presentations are refreshingly free from emotionalism and cant.

O.E.S.

NIGHTMARE IN DETROIT: A REBELLION AND ITS VICTIMS. BY VAN GORDON SAUTER AND BURLEIGH HINES. (Chicago: Regnery, 1968. 231 pages, \$4.95.)

Written in episodic style, this small book covers the seven days beginning on Sunday, July 23, 1967, and ending on Saturday, July 29—days in which 43 people died in the Detroit riot. The authors describe the death of each victim, seeking to find from family and neighbors how each became involved. The writing is vivid and colloquial. Many of the authors' conclusions bear out the findings of the National Commission on Civil Disorders.

O.E.S.

CRISIS: THE CONDITION OF THE AMERICAN CITY. EDITED BY DONALD CATTY. (Washington, D.C.: League of Women Voters, 1968. 62 pages, \$1.00.)

This tightly-packed summary of the multiple problems bedeviling American cities is the product of a series of seminars involving the headquarters staffs of Urban America, Inc. and the League of Women Voters. Highly intelligent and sophisticated in approach, it not only delineates the problems with insight and clarity but dares to offer short- and long-range solutions.

O.E.S.

THE BLACK POWER REVOLT. EDITED BY FLOYD B. BARBOUR. (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1968. 272 pages, bibliography, appendices and index, \$5.95.)

In this excellent selection of essays, the Negro speaks for himself about his problems, his needs and his demands. Beginning with a 1791 letter written by Benjamin Banneker to Thomas Jefferson, the excerpts cover the period from the Revolution, through the Civil War to the present.

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

Excerpt: Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders

On July 28, 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson established a special commission to study the causes of riots and disorders in American cities. Under the chairmanship of Governor Otto Kerner of Illinois, the commission finished its assigned task and issued a long, carefully documented report in February, 1968. The following chart taken from the report summarizes a few of the findings recorded during 1,200 interviews in 20 cities.

PERVASIVENESS OF GRIEVANCES		promptly where Negro is victim of unlawful act	
Grievances Found and Number of Cities Where Mentioned as Significant		3. <i>INADEQUATE HOUSING</i>	8
1. <i>EMPLOYMENT AND UNDER- EMPLOYMENT</i> (found in at least one of the following forms in 20 cities)		(found in at least one of the follow- ing forms in 18 cities)	
Unemployment and underemploy- ment (General lack of full-time jobs)	19	Poor housing code enforcement	13
Union discrimination	13	Discrimination in sales and rentals	12
Discrimination in hiring by local and state government	9	Overcrowding	12
Discrimination in placement by state employment service	6	4. <i>INADEQUATE EDUCATION</i>	
Discrimination in placement by pri- vate employment agencies	3	(found in at least one of the follow- ing forms in 17 cities)	
2. <i>POLICE PRACTICES</i> (found in at least one of the following forms in 19 cities)		<i>De facto</i> segregation	15
Physical abuse	15	Poor quality of instruction and fa- cilities	12
Verbal abuse	15	Inadequacy of curriculum (e.g., no Negro history)	10
Nonexistent or inadequate channels for the redress of grievances against police	13	Inadequate Negro representation on school board	10
Discrimination in employment and promotion of Negroes	13	Poor vocational education or none at all	9
General lack of respect for Negroes, i.e., using derogatory language short of threats	11	5. <i>POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND GRIEVANCE MECHANISM</i>	
Abuse of Negroes in police custody	10	(found in at least one of the follow- ing forms in 16 cities)	
Failure to answer ghetto calls		Lack of adequate Negro representa- tion	15
		Lack of response to legitimate griev- ances of Negroes	13
		Grievance mechanism nonexistent or inadequately publicized	11
		6. <i>INADEQUATE PROGRAMS</i>	
		(found in at least one of the follow- (Continued on page 368)	

"CLEVELAND NOW"

(Continued from page 361)

surface. For example, in the administration's haste to establish the program, a full accounting of the monies received was not immediately forthcoming, leading a number of the mayor's opponents to charge misuse of public funds and, in some instances, to brand "Cleveland Now" a fraud.

The administration was further damaged by the disclosure that a local black nationalist, allegedly behind the sniper deaths of three white policemen on the night of July 23, 1968, had apparently used "Cleveland Now" funds, granted to him as director of a cultural enrichment program, for the purchase of ammunition and weapons. Despite a full accounting of "Cleveland Now" funds by the administration and the success of similar enrichment programs in other parts of the ghetto, a credibility gap—not yet closed—has been opened among Cleveland's fearful ethnic minorities.

In the long run, however, the intrinsic merit of the "Cleveland Now" effort should carry it through any similar difficulties, contingent only upon Stokes' ability to translate the program into tangible results. This ability is, in the last analysis, the key in many ways to Cleveland's future.

The death of Martin Luther King Jr., gave Carl Stokes a constituency his election had not. He acted decisively to consolidate and move that constituency—and then to maintain it. Circumstances have revealed some cracks; yet 63 per cent of the Cleveland electorate, including slightly over half of the white community (according to an August, 1968, poll taken at the mayor's behest) continue to support "Cleveland Now."

The "Cleveland Now" program is conceptually sound. It provides a single focal point for combatting the major problems besetting Cleveland. In coopting ongoing efforts by public and quasi-public agencies in the problem areas, it tends to eliminate duplication of effort and functional overlap. It establishes badly-needed priorities for public

expenditure and effort. It offers a visible, highly conscious reason for community concern and commitment. Finally, Stokes himself may be given credit for a large measure of the program's success by his clear and consistent belief in the city's ability to save itself.

REBUILDING AMERICAN CITIES

(Continued from page 326)

developed a practical operating mechanism in which all urban and social specialists will come together—architects and planners, health and welfare authorities and educators, builders and transportation experts. The people of the area must, by law, be heavily involved in the planning and the implementing of these programs. This is extremely important. It is the only way to end the feeling of isolation and alienation that is so crippling to those who are poor and ignored in any society. Second, the program will operate on a large scale. Unless a major impact is made on large neighborhoods, we will be back where we started.

A NATIONAL HOUSING PROGRAM

And that brings Americans to the next long step forward they should be taking as a nation. In 1968, recognizing that housing was a basic requirement to all our other efforts, President Johnson set the United States on the pathway of a national building and rebuilding program on a scale unprecedented in this nation.³

The administration has given us these goals:

—The construction of 26.2 million new housing units, by both private and public means, in the next ten years. This can be compared to 14.4 million units built in the past decade.

—Public assistance for 4 million of these units, as compared with one-half million in the last ten years.

—Public assistance to rebuild 2 million existing units which are sound but dilapidated. This compares to 25,000 units in the last decade. (See Chart III.)

³ The total amount for residential mortgage loans provided in the past ten years (1958–1967) was \$390 billion. The total amount required in the next ten years (1968–1977) will be \$875 billion.

If the United States is to meet this schedule, new mechanisms and techniques must be created and applied on a giant scale. There must be technological advances. There must be innovations in housing finance. There must be methods of bringing private financial resources and industrial and management methods into low-income housing. There must be advances in ways of keeping utilities and public services abreast of our building efforts.

In many ways, the United States is embarked on a whole new era of experimentation in urban concerns and in the mass production of housing. It has come late. But at least Americans are now aware of the extent of their problems, and are consciously preparing to meet them on a national level. And as Americans learn, it is vitally important that knowledge be shared with other nations—as other nations have shared with the United States.

Internationally, nations can learn a good deal from one another. The greatest single difficulty in the planning of housing and urban development in the world today is not lack of resources—although that lack cannot be ignored—but of knowledge and of knowledgeable people. Many nations are striving to develop these, and to plan communities that will meet the hunger for dignity and beauty that exists in every human being. We are all striving to create urban places that enhance man's sense of well-being in his physical environment.

THE POLITICS OF URBAN CHANGE

(Continued from page 332)

from a study of the Greek city-state democracies where geographic barriers helped turn communications and interaction inward toward the polity. Today, the changes and shifts in technology have turned our communications and interactions outward, away from the local urban polity and toward the national and international worlds. In so doing, they have turned our commitments outward from the local community to the

national polity, and to the view that the city is more a political marketplace than a political community. The city is a place for the consumption of services and amenities, rather than a polity demanding responsibility and service.

WHAT OF THE FUTURE?

This essay began by asking if the American city has a future. It is now time to attempt an answer to that query. From one perspective that future is fairly bleak, for no polity can stand for long if the people are not committed to its civic prosperity. If we are simply consumers of our cities, while defining our commitments in national terms, then the fate of the city may depend on awakening the national polity to the needs and the legitimacy of the demands of the city. The national polity will have to fill the vacuum and provide the talent, resources and commitment that the cities themselves are unable to arouse.

From another perspective, there is at least one ray of hope for our cities. Local concern and participation may be aroused through local control: through the neighborhood corporation. This issue of local control, just coming to the fore, arises primarily from the black community, which has been so effectively shunted from political decision-making and power. A logical outgrowth of the civil rights movement, the desire for manhood and equality of opportunity and control, it is likely to be the most important urban political question of the next decade. If local control, participation, and the neighborhood corporation can gain a foothold in our cities, then there is hope for a revival of commitment, of political citizenship, and a rebirth of our cities. If the movement fails, the logical—although not presently politically feasible—alternative may be slowly to abandon our present cities, permitting them to continue to decay, for even now they are technologically obsolete.

In the past, men came to cities because they served a number of purposes—defense, the easier exchange of economic goods and social services, the rapid communication of

messages and ideas, preservation of societal trends, culture and heritage. Technological developments, high speed transit, television, computers and cheap long-distance telephone communication have made it possible to diffuse the traditional activities and purposes of the city, just as they have aided the diffusion of population across the nearby landscape. In addition, the development of atomic bombs and missiles have made concentrated cities prime targets and liabilities on the war maps of tomorrow.

If the demands and desires for active citizenship in the processes and policies of our cities do not successfully arise to make the effort and risk of rebuilding our present cities worthwhile, perhaps it would be better to bend with the winds of technological change, and diffuse our population across the land.

PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ORDER

(Continued from page 356)

Bacon, staff member of the President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia, asserted that many accused felons, pending delayed trials, are released without bond and rearrested for other crimes before the first charge is disposed of. In an address before the Washington Bar Association, Miss Bacon proposed that the civil calendar be sacrificed for three months while only criminal cases were heard. However, civil cases are already waiting two years before trial.

In the New York City Criminal Court System, felony cases have more than doubled during the past decade. Misdemeanor cases have increased 14 per cent during the same period, and traffic cases are up 134 per cent. In 1967, there were 58,000 felony arraignments in the New York City criminal courts, an increase of 10 per cent over 1966. Guilty pleas to reduced charges are commonplace. Early in 1968, it was estimated that the New

York City Criminal Court System had a backlog of 33,000 cases, not including a four-month backup of traffic cases which reached a staggering total of over four million in 1967. About one-fourth of the felony arraignments result in grand jury indictments and these cases must be referred to the New York Supreme Court for disposition. And the inmate population of the detention houses in New York City has risen from a daily average of 3,370 in 1957 to 4,975 in 1967, or an increase of 46.7 per cent. The census of the city's detention houses is at 150 per cent capacity.

In Chicago, the Cook County Jail has a capacity of 1,300 inmates. A grand jury investigation of conditions in the jail in 1967 revealed a population of 1,913, or about 147 per cent of capacity. The staff was undermanned. Condemned murderers under death sentences or recidivists awaiting trial for major crimes were ruling over various jail tiers. These men, known as "barn bosses," had "great control and influence over the daily operation of the jail and the lives of prisoners," according to the grand jury report.¹⁹ The President's Commission found similar conditions in other penal institutions, noting that "Certain inmates—often the most aggressive—assume control over the others with tacit staff consent. . . ."²⁰

A national survey of corrections in 1965, made by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, revealed that the average daily population under correctional authority was 1,282,386. Of this number 591,494 were adult felons, 342,688 were misdemeanants, and 348,204 were juveniles. The Commission recommended that all jurisdictions examine their need for probation and parole officers on the basis of an average of 35 offenders per officer. It concluded that, nationally, for adult felons three times the number of parole and probation officers presently employed are needed; for misdemeanants, the 1,944 officers currently employed should be raised to 15,400; and for juveniles, the present number of officers—7,706—should be increased to 13,800.²¹

Crime is a social problem of many facets

¹⁹ The Cook County Grand Jury, *Report of the December 1967 Cook County Grand Jury*, Chicago, pp. 7, 28, 29, 30.

²⁰ *The Challenge of Crime In A Free Society*, p. 163.

²¹ *The Challenge of Crime In A Free Society*, pp. 160, 162, 167.

and does not lend itself to any easy solution. It is one of the most pressing problems facing the American city and the nation. The goal of adequate public safety can never be attained unless the agencies of law enforcement and administration of justice are efficient. And it is obvious that almost every branch of the criminal justice system has significant deficiencies requiring prompt, remedial attention.

FINANCIAL PLIGHT OF THE CITIES

(Continued from page 340)

ture decisions of the receiving governments.

In connection with these figures, it is important to remember, however, that the growth of the public sector has not been accompanied by a reduction in the absolute amounts going to the private sector and thus into private disposable incomes and standards of living. The total national product has increased to give us both more than we had before personally and at the same time to increase the share going to our governments.

When military expenses are set to one side, the relationships are, of course, somewhat different. Under these conditions, the division of the governments' share of the GNP in 1964 became: federal, 23 per cent; the states, 27 per cent; and the localities, 50 per cent; a marked shift from 1927 before the Great Depression, when the division was: federal, 15 per cent; the states, 15 per cent; and the localities, 70 per cent.

The metropolitan areas are, of course, caught in this fiscal whirlpool along with the rest of the local governments. In spite of the rising problems of the new urban concentrations, they are partners of the local-government segment of our federal system, and therefore share the unhappy fate of watching their share of the GNP held down, while the federal and state shares expand. They and their local government associates have been forced back in 40 years from handling 70 per cent of the governmental expenditures to handling 50 per cent, precisely at the time in history when the major domestic problems of the

American people have been concentrated in the big cities and are becoming painfully visible and politically potent.

This rapid and significant modification of the American federal system has largely come about, not because we think local government should be de-emphasized or eliminated, but because (a) the national government has failed to deal adequately with its overriding national socio-economic responsibilities, specifically poverty and internal migration; (b) the states have failed to give the metropolitan areas a modern local political and administrative structure; and (c) we have not developed a workable fiscal system, federal, state and local, to finance and distribute the costs of running local governmental services and controls within the metropolitan regions.

And that is "the plight of the cities."

The major socio-economic and cultural problems of the American people are being concentrated in the great urban complexes. These problems are recognized by various symptoms, including poverty, racial discrimination, poor housing, deficient and at times inappropriate education, inefficient and inadequate transportation, sanitation and health and hospital services, differential unemployment, crime rates, environmental pollution, inadequate standards for recreational and cultural enjoyments, and inadequate or frustrated local leadership and management. Most of these problems will get worse because of national currents of population growth and mobility. The market mechanism which brought on our metropolitan concentrations cannot cure these fundamental difficulties; left to themselves, matters will become worse until the system destroys itself (perhaps in some form of violent change and backlash), unless effective reforms are introduced by significant public and private action.

The things that need doing here and now by government may well take another 3 to 5 per cent of the GNP annually. Most of the work to be done for people and their welfare and efficiency will have to be located where the people are in need of help, that is, chiefly in the metropolitan areas. It will not be done at arm's length in Washington or in the state

capitals; it will be done primarily in the neighborhoods of the big cities. Yet, when the cities start to increase their budgets to do the work, they find *first*, that they have no money; *second*, that they cannot raise more taxes in spite of the inherently higher tax-paying capacity of the total metropolitan area, because their revenue systems are so limited, regressive, inelastic, and location-shifting; *third*, that many of the problems with which they are working are national, arising outside of their boundaries, and that the good results of their work benefit not only their own people, but also many others in jurisdictions near and far who cannot be reached to help meet the bills; and *fourth*, that the systems of local planning, political decision-making, and administration are so fractured that they cannot proceed effectively or efficiently.

REPORT ON CIVIL DISORDERS

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ing forms in 16 cities)	
Poverty program (OEO) (e.g., insufficient participation of the poor in project planning; lack of continuity in programs; inadequate funding; and unfulfilled promises)	12
Urban renewal (HUD) (e.g., too little community participation in planning and decision-making; programs are not urban renewal but "Negro removal")	9
Employment Training (Labor-HEW) (e.g., persons are trained for jobs that are not available in the Community)	7
7. <i>DISCRIMINATORY ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE</i> (found in at least one of the following forms in 15 cities)	
Discriminatory treatment in the courts	15
Lower courts act as arm of police department rather than as an objective arbiter in truly adversary proceedings	10

Presumption of guilt when policeman testifies against Negro	8
8. <i>POOR RECREATION FACILITIES AND PROGRAMS</i> (found in at least one of the following forms in 15 cities)	
Inadequate facilities (parks, playgrounds, athletic fields, gymnasiums and pools)	15
Lack of organized programs	10
9. <i>RACIST AND OTHER DISRESPECTFUL WHITE ATTITUDES</i> (found in at least one of the following forms in 15 cities)	
Racism and lack of respect for dignity of Negroes	15
General animosity toward Negroes	10
10. <i>INADEQUATE AND POORLY ADMINISTERED WELFARE PROGRAMS</i> (found in at least one of the following forms in 14 cities)	
Unfair qualification regulations (e.g., "man in the house" rule)	6
Attitude of welfare workers toward recipients (e.g., manifestations of hostility and contempt for persons on welfare)	6
11. <i>INADEQUATE MUNICIPAL SERVICES</i> (found in at least one of the following forms in 11 cities)	
Inadequate sanitation and garbage removal	9
Inadequate health and hospital facilities	6
Inadequate street paving and lighting	6
12. <i>DISCRIMINATORY CONSUMER AND CREDIT PRACTICES</i> (found in at least one of the following forms in 11 cities)	
Inferior quality goods (especially meats and produce)	11
Overpricing (especially on days welfare checks issued)	8
Exorbitant interest rates (particularly in connection with furniture and appliance sales)	7
Fraudulent practices	6

WELFARE PROBLEMS OF THE CITIES

(Continued from page 345)

who are poor. Only through the difficult task of restructuring the nation's economic system in such a way as to provide each citizen with an adequate and secure income can this problem be resolved. Although there are many fronts upon which to attack the urban "crisis," the problems of public welfare, poverty, and the powerlessness of the poor deserve priority in both policy and action.

URBAN PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEMS

(Continued from page 351)

cation of personnel for all types of service in the school and community (professional, paraprofessional and volunteer). New and different relationships are needed between schools, families and communities which require new insights, understanding, skills and sensitivities. Massive reeducation and re-orientation programs are needed for existing personnel.

2. *Curriculum development*: building relevant programs and instructional processes to cope with the conditions of urbanization and isolation. At the macro-level, instructional systems are needed which will provide for diagnosis and individualized learning, for cognitive and affective growth, for providing meaning to the term "quality education."

3. *Community development*: attacking urban problems by combining the efforts of various agencies and institutions from the public and private sectors. Unless joint ventures mobilize multiple resources to tackle problems of housing, employment, community organization, and political power, the potential inroad by any single agency will be limited. Historically—and especially in the inner cities—the schools have tended to be aloof from their communities. They must now learn how to function in a meaningful and potent way. The move toward community participation and control (decentralization) means a new set of relationships; and

roles must be worked out for school and community. Meaningful programs equipping lay personnel and professionals for grappling with policy, curriculum, budget and areas of control and accountability are required.

4. *Comprehensive and continuing planning*: articulated programs at all levels. Urban schools have been especially weak in the areas of vocational education of manpower training and redevelopment, of continuing education for youth and adults, and for parents, and family education. For adults, gainful employment and acculturation to urban living are key needs for which the schools, in concert with other agencies, must make available more adequate provisions and services.

There is a current view that urban education is simply a euphemism for the education of ghetto children. This is a dangerous perception, for it assumes black cities, devoid of white residents after the five o'clock exodus from work places; it ignores the wide range of individual differences which actually exist in any urban population; and it will accelerate the current drift of the middle class from the central cities. Above all, the view of the city as a slum ignores the vast resources for culture and learning which reside therein. The potential for developing an urban education for an urban population remains untapped. Unless planning and provisions are made for the widest range of differences and utilize the full scope of city resources, the result can only be an intensification of the present downward spiral.

In the past decade, research and experience have shown the values and flaws of compensatory education programs. Intuitive judgments are no longer the sole resources available to planners. Educators and others have begun to learn that compensatory programs often succeed, and why. The time of crash programs and of panaceas has passed. Experiences with overcoming segregation and racial isolation have highlighted the fact that desegregation is only a first step towards equalizing education. The essential complement of desegregation is integration—the integration of capable, free individuals into the

(Continued on page 384)

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of October, 1968, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Communist Bloc

Oct. 1—At the end of a 2-day meeting in Budapest, delegates from the Soviet Union and 57 other Communist parties issue a communiqué announcing that a world Communist summit meeting formerly scheduled to be held in the Soviet Union in November, 1968, has been postponed.

Czechoslovak Crisis

Oct. 3—Czechoslovak government and party leaders arrive in Moscow for talks with Soviet leaders on a treaty.

Oct. 4—In Moscow, Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders sign a communiqué in which Czechoslovak leaders yield to Soviet demands to quell "antisocialist" forces and to restore the Czechoslovak Communist party to a position of control over all Czechoslovak life. Party control over the press, radio and television will be re-established. In exchange, the Soviet Union will withdraw most of its occupation forces, except those to be indefinitely stationed in Czechoslovakia, as provided in the August 26, 1968, agreement.

Oct. 11—Alexander Dubcek, leader of the Czechoslovak Communist party, tells the Czech people that restrictive measures will have to precede the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Oct. 16—Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin arrives in Prague. Kosygin and Czech Premier Oldrich Cernik sign a treaty giving the U.S.S.R. the right to station troops in Czechoslovakia. The treaty is reported to call for the withdrawal of all Warsaw Pact forces except for Soviet contingents in specified areas.

Oct. 18—The Czechoslovak National Assem-

bly votes to accept the treaty whereby contingents of Soviet troops, temporarily but without a time limit, will remain in Czechoslovakia.

Oct. 21—Hungarian troops, part of the Warsaw Pact forces that invaded Czechoslovakia, leave for home.

Oct. 23—It is disclosed that the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences has prepared a document rebutting Soviet propaganda justifying the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia.

Oct. 24—Soviet troops returning home from Czechoslovakia are greeted warmly by Soviet citizens.

Oct. 28—On the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Czechoslovak Republic, thousands of Czechs demonstrate to protest the Soviet invasion and occupation, despite pleas by Czechoslovak leaders for restraint.

Middle East

Oct. 8—Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, addressing the U.N. General Assembly, offers a 9-point peace plan for the Middle East, including a provision for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories following the establishment of "permanent" boundaries between Israel and her Arab neighbors.

Oct. 9—In Jerusalem, a hand grenade, tossed into a crowd of Jewish worshippers, injures 48 persons.

In Cairo, U.A.R. spokesman Mohammed H. el-Zayyat rejects the Israeli peace plan.

Oct. 10—Before the U.N. General Assembly, U.A.R. Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad declares that his government will accept a timetable worked out by Gunnar V. Jarling, U.N. special representative to the Middle East, for implementing the U.N. Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, on the Middle East.

Oct. 11—U.A.R. Foreign Minister Riad declares that Israel ships will be permitted by the U.A.R. to use the Suez Canal as part of a general settlement of the Middle East crisis.

Oct. 18—In Cairo, informants report that Jordanian and Israeli representatives are conducting talks.

Oct. 19—A spokesman for Al Fatah, Palestinian guerrilla commando organization, issues a statement that the rebels will not accept a "political solution" of the Middle East crisis.

Oct. 27—Egyptian oil refineries at Port Suez are burning following a night-long exchange of Israeli-Egyptian shelling. According to a report from Lieutenant General Odd Bull, chief of the U.N. Truce Supervisory Organization, the U.A.R. forces provoked the battle.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Oct. 11—The NATO Nuclear Planning Group, ending a 2-day meeting in Bonn, chooses Britain (Europe's leading nuclear power) and West Germany (Europe's strongest conventional weapons power) to work out guidelines for NATO's defense posture.

Oct. 15—U.S. General Lyman Lemnitzer, commander of allied forces in Europe, addresses the annual general assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association. He warns that French independence of NATO means that in the event of war in Europe, NATO forces might be forced to use nuclear weapons "at an earlier point in the conflict" than would be necessary if French participation were guaranteed.

United Nations

(See also *Middle East*)

Oct. 2—Addressing the U.N. General Assembly, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk denounces the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. Rusk warns that any Communist military aggression against West Germany will invite immediate military retaliation by NATO.

Oct. 3—Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko tells the General Assembly that the Soviet Union is interested in pursuing discussions of limiting and reducing nuclear arms, including antimissile missiles.

Oct. 25—Voting 92-2, the General Assembly adopts a resolution urging nations not to recognize Rhodesia's independence until "a government based on majority rule" is established.

War in Vietnam

Oct. 4—It is reported that yesterday U.S. planes flew 143 missions against enemy targets above the demilitarized zone.

U.S. officials in Washington report that leading Cambodian officials have publicly stated that Vietcong forces are using 3 Cambodian provinces bordering South Vietnam.

Oct. 7—It is reported that U.S. Marines have moved back into the Khesanh base in South Vietnam's northwest corner.

Oct. 9—Xuan Thuy, chief North Vietnamese representative to the Paris peace talks, urges U.S. President Lyndon Johnson to halt the bombing of North Vietnam and let the peace talks proceed. Thuy declares that "If President Johnson really wants to solve the Vietnam problem peacefully, he still has enough time and power now to do so."

Oct. 14—A special political counselor to the North Vietnamese delegation to the Paris peace talks, Le Duc Tho, leaves for "routine consultations" in Hanoi.

Oct. 15—In Washington, U.S. officials report that the casualty rate for U.S. servicemen in Vietnam is very low, close to the low number of casualties during the summer "lull."

In Saigon, military and civilian officials disclose that enemy forces have withdrawn from all of South Vietnam's major cities.

Oct. 18—*The New York Times* reports that the U.S. government has made another peace proposal to North Vietnam, by reformulating U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson's demands that Hanoi assure the U.S. that a complete bombing halt would initiate peace moves.

According to reports, South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu has asked the U.S. to demand that Hanoi meet 3 conditions before a bombing halt: enemy respect for the DMZ, cessation of the shelling of South Vietnamese cities, and inclusion of the South Vietnamese government at the Paris peace talks.

Oct. 21—U.S. military authorities release 14 North Vietnamese prisoners of war "as an action of good will."

Oct. 24—President Johnson, at a news conference, declares that he has not received a North Vietnamese reply to his administration's latest peace proposal.

The South Vietnamese government announces that 140 Vietcong prisoners will be released shortly. The Vietcong's clandestine radio announces that 11 South Vietnamese soldiers have recently been freed.

Oct. 25—A commentary broadcast by Radio Hanoi asserts that the U.S. "must unconditionally end the bombing and all other acts of war against the D.R.V."

Oct. 26—Enemy forces launch an attack against a U.S. support base 50 miles north of Saigon; U.S. forces turn back the enemy after many hours.

Oct. 28—New Zealand Prime Minister Keith J. Holyoake, on a visit to South Vietnam, declares that the latest Allied peace proposal is very generous, but he does not find any positive response coming from Hanoi.

Oct. 29—President Nguyen Van Thieu is reported to be selecting a team of negotiators to join the Paris peace talks. Reports from Saigon indicate that an agreement has been reached that will permit the National Liberation Front and the South Vietnamese representatives to participate in the talks without recognizing each other.

Oct. 30—Washington sources report that U.S. General Creighton Abrams, on a secret visit to consult with President Johnson, assured the President the military can accept the consequences of a bombing halt.

Informed sources in Paris say the peace talks are nearing a breakthrough.

Oct. 31—After days of negotiation, President

Johnson orders a halt to all bombing and shelling of North Vietnam. The Saigon government and the National Liberation Front will join the Paris talks on November 6. No reciprocal military commitments from North Vietnam have yet been announced. The President notes that "What we now expect—what we have a right to expect—are prompt, productive, serious and intensive negotiations in an atmosphere that is conducive to progress."

ALBANIA

Oct. 6—Reports from Balkan sources say that the Albanian coastal defenses are being strengthened with Chinese Communist assistance. Fears of Soviet attack from the sea are said to be behind the move.

AUSTRIA

Oct. 2—*Volksblatt*, an Austrian newspaper, reports an end to military emergency measures taken in response to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Some 11,000 conscripts are released from active army service.

BELGIUM

Oct. 3—Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel announces that Belgium is preparing a series of recommendations for the revitalization of the Western European Union made up of Great Britain and the 6 members of the European Common Market. The move is dictated by France's repeated rebuffs to Great Britain in the councils of the Common Market.

Oct. 24—Defense Minister Paul Segers reports a delay in the withdrawal of a 3,000-man Belgian army brigade from West Germany because of the continuing Warsaw Pact forces' occupation of Czechoslovakia.

BOLIVIA

Oct. 4—The Bolivian Cabinet resigns to enable its members to return to active duty with the armed forces. All the members are military personnel. The action follows a request by the Army Chief of Staff, General Alfredo Ovando Candia (delivered 24 hours ago to President René Barrientos Or-

tuño), saying that the Army was short of officers whose services were badly needed and that he felt the military men had fulfilled their obligation to the government.

BRAZIL

- Oct. 4—In the second day of student disorders in São Paulo, one student is reported killed, dozens are injured and about 40 have been arrested.
- Oct. 11—The government orders privately-held lands at five strike-bound sugar mills expropriated for distribution to the peasants.
- Oct. 12—A U.S. Army officer, Captain Charles R. Chandler, who was a student at the University of São Paulo, is killed by two Brazilian revolutionaries. Leaflets left near the body accused Captain Chandler of being a "Vietnam war criminal." The American consul, Robert Corrigan, says Captain Chandler had been in Vietnam for a year and was studying Portuguese and Brazilian history in preparation for a teaching post at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.

BULGARIA

(See also *Intl, Czechoslovak Crisis*)

- Oct. 2—The Bulgarian Telegraph Agency reports an official denial by the government that it has any territorial claims against Yugoslavia. Previous Bulgarian statements that Macedonia is ethnically Bulgarian have worried Yugoslavia in light of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.

CANADA

- Oct. 2—The Legislative Assembly of Quebec names Jean-Jacques Bertrand as Premier of the province to fill out the term of the late Daniel Johnson.

CHINA, NATIONALIST

- Oct. 8—A reduction in the 600-thousand-man Army is predicted following recent U.S. cuts in military aid funds. The U.S. military advisory group will be reduced from 500 to 200 men.

- Oct. 10—The Republic of China celebrates National Day on Double Ten (the 10th day of the 10th month) as the 19th Anniversary of the Chinese Republic.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

- Oct. 1—The 19th anniversary of the Communist regime is celebrated as National Day.
- Oct. 14—Reports from *Hsinhua*, the official Chinese news agency, indicate bumper crops in rice and wheat.
- Oct. 27—A bulletin issued by the Canton Red Guard indicates that political conflicts are slowing the development and production of nuclear and other armaments.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Kinshasa)

- Oct. 9—Former Education Minister Pierre Mulele, who served in the government of the late Patrice Lumumba, is executed for his part in leading insurrections in 1961-1964.

CUBA

- Oct. 8—In honor of Ernesto Che Guevara, Cubans observe a "Day of the Guerrilla" by working in the fields or overtime in the factories at no extra pay. Tomorrow is the first anniversary of Guevara's death.

The Havana radio announces the execution of two men convicted of having set fires in a clothing warehouse in Camaguey. Four other persons, including a woman, are given prison sentences from 15 to 30 years for their part in the act of sabotage.

- Oct. 19—It is reported that a Havana radio commentator, Guido Garcia Inclan, has said that despite strong Government measures rebellious youths continue to defy the Castro regime. On September 28, the first disclosure of the existence of the groups was made by Premier Fidel Castro, who said they had been roaming the streets of Havana, burning Cuban flags and destroying portraits of Guevara, public telephones and school furniture. Castro charged the youths wanted to make Havana a revised

version of Prague. He ordered the activities stopped by stringent police measures.

CYPRUS

Oct. 19—Defense and Interior Minister Polykarpos Georgiades is accused of having planned the attempted assassination of Greek Premier George Papadopoulos last August 13. Georgiades denies the charge.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

(See also *Intl, Czechoslovak Crisis*)

Oct. 26—A new constitutional law is adopted by the National Assembly giving the Czechs and the Slovaks equality in a new federation through direct elections to the new federal parliament.

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Oct. 13—The former colony of Spanish Guinea becomes independent. The new President is Francisco Macias Nguema.

FRANCE

Oct. 3—Alain Poher, a conservative anti-Gaullist, is elected Senate president.
Oct. 11—By a vote of 441 to 0, the French National Assembly adopts a fundamental charter for university reform.

GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

Oct. 18—Reports reach West Germany of the movement of East German troops toward the Berlin border.
Oct. 25—Reports from East Germany tell of the trials and conviction of university students who demonstrated against the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Several of the defendants are children of prominent East German officials.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Oct. 6—An offer to resume discussions with the U.S.S.R. on a peaceful understanding in Europe is made by Chancellor Kurt-Georg Kiesinger. Talks had been broken off following the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Oct. 8—A meeting between Foreign Minister Willy Brandt and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko is held to explore the possibilities of peaceful cooperation.

Oct. 11—Brandt says that West Germany will wait for East European initiatives in seeking closer ties.

Oct. 16—Dissolution of the West Berlin branch of the National Democratic party (N.P.D.), the right-wing West German party, is announced by its leader, Adolf von Thadden. The move is seen as an attempt to forestall action by the Allied governments and by East Germans.

Oct. 27—For the first time, the new Communist party will offer candidates in the federal parliamentary elections next year.

Oct. 28—Kiesinger arrives in Madrid for a 2-day visit, the first by a head of a West European government since the Spanish Civil War.

GREECE

Oct. 3—Some 42 prisoners are released from detention on the islands of Leros and Yiaros by the Greek military government. More than 2,000 prisoners remain in custody for "political crimes."

INDONESIA

Oct. 29—*The New York Times* reports that the Indonesian government is continuing its drive against members of the Communist party, outlawed in Indonesia.

IRISH REPUBLIC

Oct. 18—Final returns from a national referendum on the question of abolishing proportional representation as a method of voting show overwhelming support for maintaining the system. The government, led by Prime Minister John M. Lynch, had urged the single vote system used in the U.S.

ISRAEL

(See *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

JAPAN

Oct. 29—The resignation of the foreign minister, Takeo Miki, is announced. He will

run against Eisaku Sato, present Premier, for the leadership of the Liberal-Democratic party.

LUXEMBOURG

Oct. 29—The cabinet resigns in a dispute over state salaries. A new general election will be called.

MALAYSIA

Oct. 19—The Government announces that talks with the Philippines over the reconciliation of the Sabah dispute have been cancelled.

MEXICO

Oct. 1—Student leaders at the National University say that despite government concessions they will not return to class until their demands for government and police reforms have been met. The students took possession of the university campus yesterday after federal troops moved out. Evacuation of the troops was a major concession of the government.

Oct. 2—Heavy fighting breaks out in a housing project in Mexico City as federal troops and students resume the street battles which have been going on for two months. The official toll of the battle is 28 dead and 200 wounded. But it is reliably reported that 49 are dead, 500 have been wounded and 1,500 persons have been jailed.

Oct. 4—Anti-government student rallies are held in the northern cities of Monterrey and Aguascalientes to protest the police action in breaking up the student demonstration in Mexico City the night of October 2. Meanwhile, students in Mexico City vow to continue their protests in the face of a police warning that no mercy will be shown.

Oct. 9—It is reported that two representatives of President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz met with leaders of the student protest movement yesterday to explore ways of organizing negotiations to end the 10-week conflict between the students and the government. The two government representatives are Jorge de la Vega Dominguez, head

of the Institute of Political, Economic and Social Studies of the Institutional Revolutionary party, and Andres Caso, personnel manager of the government-run Mexican Petroleum Corporation.

Oct. 12—President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz proclaims the opening of the XIX Olympiad at the Olympic Stadium in Mexico City.

NIGERIA

Oct. 1—Nigerian troops continue their drive toward the Biafran capital at Umuahia.

Capture of the crossroads town of Okigwi is announced by Nigerian army leaders.

PANAMA

Oct. 1—Dr. Arnulfo Arias takes office as President of Panama for the third time as he is sworn into office before the National Assembly while thousands of his followers cheer outside the chamber.

Oct. 12—Two national guard officers, Colonel Bolivar Urrutia and Colonel José Maria Pinilla, form a junta to rule Panama following a coup last night by the National Guard.

In the Canal Zone, two miles from the Presidential Palace, President Arnulfo Arias meets with his cabinet and issues a statement that he will soon be back in office. It is the third time that Arias has been ousted as President.

U.S. Secretary of State Rusk says the military overthrow of the Panamanian government is of profound concern to the United States.

Oct. 13—Arias, whose government was overthrown on October 11, calls on his followers to go into the streets and fight.

Oct. 18—Meeting with the press, Provisional President José M. Pinilla reaffirms the desire of the junta for elections. He says that within a few days new justices of the electoral tribunal will be named and they will plan for the elections.

PERU

Oct. 1—The government of Premier Osvaldo Herccelles resigns following a dispute over

the terms of a contract with an American oil company. President Belaunde Terry accepts the resignation of the four-month-old Cabinet which has been under attack from the Opposition and government legislators since August, 1968, when it signed a contract taking over the Brea and Pariñas oil fields from the American International Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey, and placing them under control of the State Oil Board. Last week, the government agreed to revise the contract following allegations that the last page, containing details of the payments to be made to the oil company, has disappeared.

Oct. 3—In a pre-dawn *coup d'état*, military leaders overthrow the government of President Fernando Belaunde Terry. Belaunde Terry is taken by plane to Buenos Aires and all 11 members of the new Cabinet are under house arrest. The Cabinet had been sworn in only 14 hours before the coup. General Juan Velasco, Army Chief of Staff and President of the Joint Chiefs, is made head of the new military government.

Oct. 4—In a communiqué, Peru's military leaders abrogate an agreement reached two months ago between President Belaunde Terry, who has been deposed, and the International Petroleum Company. The agreement had given the Government title to the Company's oil fields at La Brea-Pariñas, but had reserved surface rights, equipment, sales and prospecting privileges for the company.

Oct. 9—The military government takes possession of the \$200-million oil field, refinery and related property of the International Petroleum Corporation.

Oct. 18—Great Britain recognizes the Peruvian military government.

PHILIPPINES

(See *Malaysia*)

RHODESIA

Oct. 13—Peace talks between Ian D. Smith, leader of the Rhodesian government, and British Prime Minister Harold Wilson end

without agreement. Smith takes British terms back to Rhodesia, but little hope is held for their acceptance.

SOUTH AFRICA, REPUBLIC OF

Oct. 28—In response to Prime Minister Balthazar J. Vorster's criticism of clergymen who use their pulpits to condemn the government, it is reported that a group of South African clergymen have sent an open letter to Vorster affirming their intention to continue to oppose apartheid.

SYRIA

Oct. 29—President Nureddin al-Attassi replaces the premier, Yussef Zayen, and a number of other cabinet officers. The replacements are largely army men.

U.S.S.R., THE

(See also *Intl, Czechoslovak Crisis*)

Oct. 11—Five Soviet citizens who protested the invasion of Czechoslovakia are convicted by a Moscow court. Three are sentenced to exile for staging a protest in Red Square; two are given prison terms for displaying posters in front of the Kremlin.

Oct. 26—*Soyuz 3*, piloted by Colonel Georgi Beregovoi, orbits the earth. This is the first Soviet manned space flight since April, 1967, when a space flight ended in the death of Soviet astronaut Vladimir Komarov.

Oct. 30—*Soyuz 3* makes a successful soft landing.

UNITED KINGDOM, THE

(See also *Rhodesia, Belgium*)

Oct. 26—The John F. Kennedy memorial at Runnymede is severely damaged by a bomb.

UNITED STATES

Civil Rights

Oct. 3—The New York City Housing Authority withholds approval of building contracts because the construction firms will not guarantee jobs to Negroes and Puerto Ricans.

Oct. 5—The Urban Coalition of Newark es-

7 establishes a \$1-million fund to provide loans to businesses established in slum areas.

Oct. 7—An agreement is reached between the Elizabeth, N.J., Board of Education and 150 striking high school students. A course in Negro history and the hiring of more Negro teachers have been demanded.

Oct. 11—The Board of Education of Mount Vernon, New York, seeks a reversal of a state Department of Education ruling requiring racial integration of the public schools. The dispute has continued for 5 years.

Tensions ease in Cleveland after Mayor Carl Stokes replaces the police chief and announces a \$17-million modernization fund for the police department.

Oct. 12—Students at New York University occupy 2 buildings in protest over the October 10 dismissal of John F. Hatchett, director of the Martin Luther King Afro-American Student Center, after he called Richard Nixon and Hubert Humphrey "racist bastards."

Several New York City unions have agreed to upgrade Negro and Puerto Rican workers in order to secure city contracts, according to James Norton, director of the city's contract compliance division.

Oct. 14—President James Hester of New York University tells students they may picket for Hatchett's reinstatement but they must not bar other students from classes.

A 3-judge federal court panel orders 19 Alabama school districts to hasten school desegregation.

Oct. 15—Vandalism breaks out at the up-town campus of New York University in the continuing student protest over the dismissal of John Hatchett.

Oct. 17—Students occupy President Hester's office at New York University.

Oct. 19—A year-long drive, financed by a \$15,000 grant from the Justice Department, to recruit more Negroes into the state of Michigan's police force has failed, according to officials of the drive.

Oct. 21—The Southern Regional Council reports the enrollment of 1 million new Negro voters in the South in 1968.

The Economy

Oct. 9—The Bureau of Labor Statistics announces a 0.1 per cent increase in the unemployment rate for September. This is said to be the normal, expected increase for the season.

Oct. 15—The Department of Commerce reports very little slowdown in the expansion of the economy. A rise of \$17.9-billion for the third quarter brings the annual rate of the gross national product to \$870.8 billion.

Oct. 20—The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that jobs in industry and weekly wage rates have doubled since 1940; population has increased only 50 per cent in the same period.

Oct. 28—The Department of Commerce reports that U.S. foreign trade showed the largest surplus of the year in September, 1968, some \$282 million, seasonably adjusted.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, Czechoslovak Crisis, War in Vietnam*)

Oct. 6—Secretary of State Dean Rusk meets with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in New York.

Oct. 7—The State Department issues a statement regretting last Tuesday's military *coup d'état* in Peru. (See *Peru*.)

Oct. 9—President Lyndon B. Johnson tells the State Department to begin negotiations to sell supersonic jet fighter-bombers to Israel.

Oct. 10—Nathaniel Davis is named ambassador to Guatemala to succeed the late John Gordan Mein, who was assassinated August 28, 1968.

Oct. 12—A reaffirmation of U.S. support for West Berlin is made by Defense Secretary Clark Clifford.

McGeorge Bundy, former foreign policy advisor to Presidents Johnson and John F. Kennedy and a former "hawk" on Vietnam, proposes a troop reduction and bombing halt in Vietnam. Bundy says his stand was correct at the time, but "we must begin to lift this burden from our lives."

Oct. 14—State Department spokesmen rebuke deposed President Arnulfo Arias of Panama for his "call to arms." Arias is a refugee in the Canal Zone. (See also *Panama*.)

Oct. 25—Formal recognition is extended to the new military junta in Peru; foreign aid is still withheld.

Government

(See also *Supreme Court*)

Oct. 1—The President signs a law establishing a 201,250-acre Flaming Gorge National Recreation Area on the Utah-Wyoming border.

The House completes congressional action on legislation to remove from the federal budget the Federal Intermediate Credit Banks for cooperatives, producing a technical reduction of \$771 million in the federal budget.

Oct. 2—The President signs 4 conservation bills: creating the 58,000-acre Redwood National Park; the North Cascades National Park, with 2 adjacent recreation areas and a wilderness area—an area covering 1.1 million acres in all; a Wild Scenic Rivers System, naming all or parts of 8 rivers; and a system of Scenic Trails providing urban and rural trails, beginning with the Appalachian Trail in the East and the Pacific Coast Trail in the West.

Oct. 4—The Senate unanimously ratifies a treaty updating an international agreement of 1951 protecting the rights of refugees.

The \$51-million David D. Terry Dam is formally dedicated, the sixth of 17 projects to link the Mississippi River to Tulsa, Oklahoma, one of the most expensive federal public works projects in history. It is estimated that by 1970 the Arkansas River navigation project will have cost \$1.2 billion.

Oct. 7—The President signs an act authorizing the Department of the Interior to set up experimental and demonstration plants for development of fish protein concentrates.

The President signs a \$14.57-billion ap-

propriation bill to finance the Department of Housing and Urban Development and some independent agencies for fiscal 1969.

Oct. 8—The Senate unanimously ratifies a treaty providing for the rescue and return of astronauts accidentally downed on foreign soil.

Oct. 9—The President names a 7-member National Water Commission to spend 5 years on a \$5-million study of the nation's water needs.

Oct. 10—President Johnson says he will not name any other candidate for the office of Chief Justice of the United States, in view of the Senate refusal to ratify his nomination of Associate Justice Abe Fortas for the post. (See also *Supreme Court*.)

Oct. 11—Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D. Mont.) announces the postponement of consideration of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty to the 91st Congress, despite an appeal from the President.

Oct. 12—The President signs a law setting aside a 34-acre site in Washington to house foreign embassies, chanceries and international organizations.

Oct. 14—Congress adjourns, after legislation to allow the 3 major presidential candidates free time for a televised debate is blocked by Republican filibuster in the House. The 91st Congress will convene January 3, 1969.

Oct. 15—The President signs a \$576-million health services bill, including provision for a federal program for treating alcoholics and an extension of medical aid to migrant workers.

The Federal Reserve Board publishes 60 pages of suggested regulations to administer the Truth-in-Lending Act.

Oct. 16—The President signs a \$7.3-billion higher education bill authorizing funds for higher education, including a \$3.1-billion authorization of grants and loans for construction of new college and university buildings, and a \$1.87-billion authorization for government loans, federal scholarships and insured loans for college students.

He also signs a \$3-billion, 3-year vocational education bill.

Oct. 17—Administration officials estimate total federal spending for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969, at \$186 billion.

Oct. 18—The President signs a bill authorizing the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to establish a radiation-control program for electronic products, to protect consumers against radiation from color television, and other electronic devices.

Oct. 22—The President signs gun control legislation effective December 16 forbidding the interstate mail-order sale of rifles, shotguns and ammunition; banning over-the-counter sales of firearms to most out-of-state residents; banning sales of rifles and shotguns to persons under 18 and of handguns to persons under 21; and forbidding firearms sales to convicted felons, fugitives, drug addicts and mental defectives.

Oct. 23—The President signs legislation extending educational benefits to some widows of servicemen and broadening educational benefits for veterans, allowing veterans to receive 4 years of college for 2 years of service.

Oct. 25—The President signs legislation extending for 3 years a federal program to train workers in new or improved job skills; the program was first established in 1962.

Oct. 28—Joseph Cooper, chairman of the political science department at Rice University, announces that after leaving office next January, President Johnson will teach a series of seminars at Rice.

The White House announces that Robert W. Komer, head of the U.S. pacification program in Vietnam, has been named ambassador to Turkey.

Labor

Oct. 1—A new 3-year contract is ratified by workers at the Boeing Company airplane plants, averting a threatened strike.

Police, firemen and sanitation workers in New York City postpone a threatened slowdown as Arthur J. Goldberg offers to mediate their pay disputes with the city.

Oct. 3—The administration of Columbia University agrees to hold a union election to determine representation for non-academic employees. This was one of the points at issue in the student demonstrations last spring.

Oct. 4—A court injunction under the Taft-Hartley Law ends a 1-day strike by the International Longshoremen's Association. Wage rates are the issue in dispute.

Oct. 12—New York City's uniformed forces agree to new contracts. The contracts must be ratified by the members.

Oct. 14—The Policemen's Benevolent Association rejects the contract offered by the city and approved by union officers.

The United Federation of Teachers goes on strike for the third time in 6 weeks because of failure to resolve the continuing issue of local control of schools in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville section of Brooklyn. (See *U.S. Labor*, September 9 and 29, *Current History*, November, 1968, p. 319.)

Oct. 15—A contract is signed by the United Mine Workers ending a strike that began October 9.

Oct. 20—N.Y. police start to "call in sick" in a slowdown protesting the city's refusal to make a new contract offer.

Oct. 22—Firemen join in the police protest by refusing to perform any but emergency jobs in New York.

Oct. 25—Police and fire union leaders in New York City defy a court order and tell their men to continue their slowdown.

Oct. 26—N.Y. police end their slowdown in response to a court order.

Oct. 28—Firemen join the New York City police in resuming a full work schedule. They agree to reconsider the original contract offer.

Oct. 31—The New York City school strike continues.

Military

Oct. 2—Demobilization of the 16,000 Air National Guardsmen mobilized after the *Pueblo* incident will be completed by June

30, 1969, according to the Defense Department.

Oct. 14—Second tours of duty in Vietnam are announced for 24,000 soldiers and marines.

Oct. 21—It is announced in Washington that a cutback in production of F-111 planes is being studied by the Defense Department.

Oct. 31—The Navy announces that parts of the nuclear submarine *Scorpion* have been located 10,000 feet below the Atlantic surface off the Azores, after a 5-month search.

Politics

Oct. 1—Former Vice President Richard Nixon, Republican candidate for President, promises to end "heavy handed bureaucratic regulation" of the securities industry if he is elected. His statement was sent to leaders of the securities industry but has not been made public by Nixon.

Oct. 3—Former Alabama Governor George Wallace, American Independent party candidate for President, selects General Curtis LeMay, retired Air Force Chief of Staff, as his vice-presidential running mate.

Oct. 4—Vice President Hubert Humphrey, Democratic candidate for President, proposes that the federal government turn back some of its tax revenues to the states and communities to give them more flexibility in solving their problems.

Oct. 15—George Wallace is placed on the ballot in Ohio by a ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court.

Oct. 16—The Michigan Attorney General rules that Minnesota Senator Eugene McCarthy, unsuccessful candidate for the Democratic nomination for President, cannot be placed on the Michigan ballot.

Oct. 17—Nixon backs a bombing pause in Vietnam if it will not cost American lives.

The New York State Court of Appeals rules that Senator McCarthy's name should be removed from the New York ballot.

Oct. 18—The vice-presidential candidate on the Democratic ticket, Edmund S. Muskie, Senator from Maine, urges the Senate to ratify the treaty to stop the spread of nu-

clear weapons as its first order of business in January, 1969.

Oct. 19—Nixon recommends a multilateral Asian security pact.

General LeMay claims the curb in bombing in North Vietnam is costing American lives. He is contradicted by an aide to General Creighton Abrams, U.S. Commander in Vietnam.

Oct. 21—Nixon urges federal aid for private schools.

Oct. 24—Nixon pledges to restore arms superiority over the U.S.S.R.

Oct. 26—Nixon pledges to seek a curb on the arms race. This statement is seen as a reaction to criticism of his statement of October 24.

Governor of Maryland Spiro Agnew, Republican vice-presidential candidate, calls for a crackdown on student protesters.

Oct. 28—Humphrey opens a motor tour of Ohio; he warns that the Republican party was responsible for 3 recessions and large-scale unemployment during the Eisenhower Administration.

Oct. 29—Senator McCarthy announces he will vote for Humphrey for President.

Science and Space

Oct. 11—The Apollo 7 is launched successfully for a 3-man, 11-day flight that is viewed as a prelude to a U.S. mission to land a man on the moon.

Oct. 22—The Apollo 7 astronauts land in the Atlantic Ocean after a successful 11-day earth orbiting flight.

Supreme Court

(See also *Government*)

Oct. 2—Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Abe Fortas asks President Johnson to withdraw his nomination for Chief Justice "to end the destructive and extreme assaults upon the Court." President Johnson, agreeing to the withdrawal, calls the Senate action "historically and constitu-

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THE MONTH IN REVIEW

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tionally tragic." The President's nomination of Judge Homer Thornberry to succeed Associate Justice Fortas is automatically withdrawn.

Oct. 7—The Supreme Court begins its 179th year, with Earl Warren still serving as Chief Justice.

In a 1-sentence order, the Court rejects the protests of 256 Army reservists who have claimed they were being sent to Vietnam illegally.

Oct. 19—The state of Alabama must put racially integrated candidates representing the new National Democratic party of Alabama and opposed to George C. Wallace on the slate for the election on November 5, according to an unsigned order by the Court.

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

Oct. 5—General Duong Van Minh, leader of the 1963 coup that overthrew President Ngo Dinh Diem, returns from a 4-year exile.

Oct. 9—A South Vietnamese government spokesman reports that a number of South Vietnamese marine and army officers have been arrested for their role in an abortive coup against the government of President Nguyen Van Thieu.

Oct. 10—President Thieu, in a television-radio broadcast, tells the nation that there has not been an attempted coup.

Oct. 17—The first South Vietnamese Supreme Court, composed of 9 men, is elected by the National Assembly.

YEMEN

Oct. 24—It is reported that Republican and royalist elements are fighting around Sana, the capital, and in the mountain heights nearby. The battle supposedly began 10 days ago when a royalist force appeared close to Sana.

YUGOSLAVIA

Oct. 17—U.S. Under Secretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach arrives in Belgrade for a 2-day visit.

Oct. 18—Katzenbach confers with President Tito.

Oct. 20—President Tito, addressing a crowd of 100,000 persons in Leskovac, attacks Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and declares that Yugoslavia will defend herself if necessary against such Communist intervention.

URBAN PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEMS

(Continued from page 369)

unity of shared citizenship within the same urban community. Developing more effective community participation in the control of public education can be a boon or a bust, depending on the end goals and the means employed for attaining them.

The deteriorating condition of America's central cities and the plight of public education, which is both a contributing cause to and a consequence of this worsening situation, are the nation's most critical problems. As the Commission on Civil Disorders warned, continuing economic and social decay "in the racial ghetto and the resulting discontent and disruption threaten democratic values fundamental to our progress as a free society."¹² In the past, America's public schools have always played a leadership role in the nation's development. There are those who believe that the schools can contribute again, if new forms and new structures are tried and if the schools do not cling to a nostalgic past which is no longer effective.

¹² National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, *op. cit.*, p. 410.

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